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I. Introduction
Nearly one hundred years ago Learned Hand explored the use of
expert witnesses at common law. Hand acknowledged that "good
historical reasons" supported the use of expert testimony to educate
jurors, but concluded that the common-law "method" of tapping expert
knowledge was "an anomaly fertile of much practical inconvenience." 1
Undoubtedly, Hand would have been equally chagrined by the Federal
Rules of Evidence, but for different reasons. Although the federal rules
eliminated much of the common law's "practical inconvenience," they
simultaneously created a regime that unduly degrades the protection
of exclusionary rules by threatening to give experts the power to deter-
mine what evidence the jury should hear.
Often overlooked by courts and commentators,2 Rule 703 is perhaps
the oddest provision governing experts among the Federal Rules of
Evidence. Enacted ostensibly to bring the law into conformity with
how experts actually reach conclusions, Rule 703 fits uncomfortably
with the myriad of exclusionary rules, such as those limiting hearsay
or character evidence. Nor can it be easily squared with the doctrine
of limited admissibility, which permits evidence to be received for some
purposes but not others.
1. Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony,
15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 40 (1901). Hand argued that expert witnesses should be scrapped in
favor of an "advisory tribunal," composed of independent experts, who would have the final
power to determine the esoteric issue. Id. at 56.
Hand wrote the article as a young lawyer with the help and encouragement of James Bradley
Thayer, his evidence professor at Harvard. The article first appeared in the obscure Albany
MedicalAnnals; thus, its first audience consisted of doctors, the largest pool of courtroom experts.
GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: TiE MAN AND ThE JUDGE 51, 60 (1994). The article's
original version featured an attack on the "absurdities" of the common law, which Hand deleted
from the version that appeared in the Harvard Law Review. Id. at 60.
2. One has only to contrast the paltry attention paid Rule 703 with the vast literature
addressing the admissibility of expert opinion testimony under Rule 702. See, e.g., Symposium,
Scientific Evidence After the Death of Frye, 15 CAIDOzO L. REv. 1745 (1994). Various aspects
of Rule 703 have been addressed by a number of scholars. See Ronald L. Carlson, Collision
Course in Expert Testimony: Limitations on Affirmative Introduction of Underlying Data, 36
U. FLA. L. REv. 234 (1984) [hereinafter Carlson, Collision Course]; see also Ronald L. Carlson,
Policing the Bases of Modern Expert Testimony, 39 VAND. L. REv. 577 (1986) [hereinafter
Carlson, Policing]; JoAnne A. Epps, Clarifying the Meaning of Federal Rule of Evidence 703,
36 B.C. L. REv. 53 (1994); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Meaning of "Facts or Data" in Federal
Rule of Evidence 703: The Significance of the Supreme Court's Decision To Rely on Federal
Rule 702 in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 54 MD. L. REV. 352 (1995); Paul
R. Rice, Inadmissible Evidence as a Basis for Expert Opinion Testimony: A Response to Professor
Carlson, 40 VAND. L. REv. 583 (1987).
[Vol. 20.467
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Rule 703 allows experts to predicate opinions on two very different
sources.3 First, experts can base their opinions on evidence that has
been admitted into the record.4 Not surprisingly, allowing experts to
utilize the same information as jurors has not stirred the slightest whisper
of controversy. But experts can also base their opinions on a second
type of evidence that cannot be considered by the jury-at least according
to formal doctrine. Rule 703 permits experts to use inadmissible evidence,
provided it is of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field
in drawing inferences or opinions! The rule thus allows experts of
all kinds to express conclusions and opinions that are predicated upon
facts or data that are not, at least technically, before the jury.
Problems arise, however, when experts are called upon to explain
how they reached a conclusion. What should be done with the experts'
inadmissible bases? Does the experts' reliance validate the otherwise
inadmissible information, thereby transforming it into admissible evi-
dence? Conversely, should the court bar any mention of the tainted
bases while permitting only the expert's testimony about the opinion?
Or should the judge instruct the jury to consider the inadmissible bases
for whatever bearing they have on the cogency of the expert's opinion
testimony, but not for any other purpose? If the judge elects the latter
course, what exactly does such an instruction mean? And if such limiting
instructions are meaningless, is Rule 703 a device that allows a party
to simply parade inadmissible evidence before the jury in direct contraven-
tion of the exclusionary rules?
Although academic lawyers and appellate courts are beginning to
give Rule 703 the attention that it deserves, 6 the rule's ambiguity has
long festered in the trial courts. Indeed the belated attention paid to
Rule 703 is perhaps best explained by the ease with which dubious jury
instructions are used to paper over the rule's ambiguities. Doctrinal
consistency is assured through the mechanism of a rank fiction; namely,
that the jury will follow a largely meaningless instruction. More precisely,
the consistency rests on the ambiguity of what is meant when we say
that something is admitted into evidence.
3. See FED. R. EVID. 703.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See Epps, supra note 2, at 60-61; Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 360.
19971
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The difficulty over Rule 703 is compounded by several related
developments. The Federal Rules of Evidence have influenced the law
of evidence enormously. Since the early 1970s nearly forty states have
enacted evidence codes based largely on the federal rules.7 Although
the various jurisdictions have added their own touches to the federal
model over the years, nearly all have followed the federal template with
respect to the critical rules governing relevancy, limited admissibility,
and expert evidence.8 Thus, the problem is national in scope. Moreover,
the Federal Rules of Evidence have dramatically affected trial practice
by creating forums that literally invite expert assistance in all shapes,
colors, and sizes. Indeed, it may be said without too much exaggeration
that the federal rules fostered (or at least nurtured) the explosion of the
expert witness industry.9 Courts have had trouble enough controlling
the kinds of admissible opinions offered by experts. Rule 703 compounds
the problem by explicitly allowing experts to use inadmissible evidence
to reach those opinions.
This Article has a number of objectives. Its primary purpose is to
explain the present controversy over Rule 703 and Rule 70510 in light
of the rules' common-law antecedents. The federal rules reformed some
aspects of the common law but left the superstructure intact. Over the
last twenty years, Rules 703 and 705 have been interpreted as though
they swept away all common-law vestiges." It is time, then, to step
back and examine the evolution of expert evidence law over the last
hundred years. The historical record reveals the persistence of both
problems and solutions.
The thesis is that the common law's abhorrence of hearsay resulted
in arcane rules designed to force experts to heed the same exclusionary
7. Thirty-eight states have adopted rules of evidence based on the federal template, as
have military courts and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. See 21 CHARLES A. WRIGHT
& KENNETH W. GRAHAM JR., FEDERAL PRAcncE AND PROCEDURE § 5009 (Supp. 1996).
8. Index & Tables, JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., WEINsTEIN'S EViDENCE T-1 to 184 (Supp.
1994).
9. Paul F. Rothstein, Needed: A Rewrite Where the Federal Rules of Evidence Should
Be Clarified, CRIM. JUST., Summer 1989, at 20, 22.
10. Rule 705 addresses the disclosure of the data underlying the expert's opinion. See
FED. R. EVID. 705 and discussion infra part II.D.4.
11. See GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EViDENCE § 12.2, at 485-91
(2d ed. 1987).
[Vol. 20:467
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rules that applied to lay witnesses and, of course, to the jury. The
common law tailored a suit that fit lay witnesses but insisted that experts
of considerably greater girth squeeze into the same size suit of clothes.
Just as juries would base verdicts only on admissible evidence, experts
would predicate opinions based only on admissible evidence. Rules
requiring hypothetical questions and compelling experts to disgorge
their personal knowledge ensured, in theory, that experts relied only
on admissible evidence. In place by the 1890s, the highly formal
common-law system sprouted numerous exceptions and inconsistencies
because courtroom practice could not be completely reconciled with
how experts conducted themselves outside of court or how lawyers
prepared them to testify. In short, one size did not fit all. The common
law attempted unsuccessfully to maintain doctrinal consistency while
accommodating expert witnesses who did not fit easily into the doctrinal
framework.
By the early 1960s expert evidence law badly needed retooling. The
Federal Rules of Evidence reformed some of the glaring deficiencies
in the common-law practice, but its innovations were implanted into
the basic contours of the common law. Reform did not signal repudiation.
In particular, the federal rules did not contemplate allowing experts to
dump inadmissible evidence before juries or decide for themselves what
jurors need to hear in order to appreciate the expert's opinion. There
exists, then, an essential continuity between Rule 703 and common-law
practice that is sometimes overlooked in celebrations over the supposed
demise of the hypothetical question rule.2 Moreover, this Article
emphasizes the intractable problems that arise because our legal system
imposes standards of admissibility that conflict with how experts use
evidence in their specialized practices. Although late nineteenth-century
judges and commentators imposed a rigid formalistic solution that soon
wilted under the hot lights of day-to-day trial practice, the same problems
persist today under the federal rules. And it may be that modem
solutions, especially the placebo of limited admissibility, are equally
formalistic and unsatisfactory, albeit for different reasons.
Another purpose of this Article is to emphasize that evidence doctrine
does not exist in an academic vacuum. Evidentiary rules are used daily
by lawyers in courtrooms across the country. More attention should
12. The continuity extends as well to Rule 705. See discussion infra part HI.DA.
1997]
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be paid to how trial lawyers employ evidentiary rules to place favorable
information before the jury or block unfavorable evidence offered by
the opponent.13 Courts and commentators may have been slow to see
the issues, but Rule 703 has been an effective tool for circumventing
exclusionary rules and presenting inadmissible evidence to juries.
Problems under Rule 703 have not, however, arisen because nefarious
trial lawyers subvert technically sound evidentiary doctrine through guile
or ignorance. Trial lawyers will offer any and all evidence that favors
their case. If judges are willing to allow experts to testify about inadmis-
sible evidence subject only to an incomprehensible limiting instruction,
trial lawyers will use this tool-or any other-to persuade the jury.
Moreover, it is especially important that we confront the reality that
some experts are spoon fed inadmissible evidence so that they can relate
it to the jury along with their opinions.
The third objective of this Article is to confront the ambiguity over
the distinction between admissible and inadmissible evidence. The
common law took largely a bipolar exclusionary approach. Exclusionary
rules, such as those governing hearsay or character evidence, regulated
the flow of information to the jury. Evidence was either in or out; that
is, the jury was either free to consider the evidence for any relevant
purpose or the jury never heard about it. The common law was thus
skeptical about admitting evidence for a limited purpose, fearing that
the jury would disregard any restrictive instruction and use the evidence
for whatever purpose it saw fit. Modem evidence is less stringently
bipolar. Admissibility extends across an ever widening continuum.
Greater faith in limiting instructions and, accordingly, the judge's power
to educate the jury reflects a reduced confidence in the efficacy of
exclusionary rules. Unfortunately, inadequate attention is paid to the
efficacy of the limiting instructions (Can juries actually draw the
distinctions as explained by the judge?) or the costs of a game in which
lawyers counter exclusionary rules by articulating some good reason
for allowing the evidence any way.
Part II surveys the common-law rules on expert evidence. Parts II.B.
and II.C. examine the instances when experts were permitted to testify
and the rigid requirements that controlled the form that expert testimony
took before the jury. These sections draw on authorities from the 1890s,
13. See infra notes 495-98.
[Vol. 20:467
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when the common-law rules had crystallized into a highly elaborate
formal system. Special attention is paid to what experts could tell the
jury about their general theories (the "major premises") as well as the
case-specific facts (the "minor premises") that supported their opinions
in the particular case.
By the early 1960s serious rents had been torn in the common-law
fabric, especially with regard to medical experts. 4 Part II.D. examines
the common law on the eve of the federal rules, focusing on three
particular problems that later received special attention from the architects
of the federal rules: (1) experts' reliance on treatises, articles, and other
published compilations; (2) the admissibility of statements made by
patients to physicians; and (3) experts' reliance on tests or reports
prepared by others. Part II.D. also explores the common-law genesis
of the idea of "expert validation" of inadmissible evidence, which figured
prominently into the drafting of Rule 703.
Part III assesses expert evidence under Article VII of the federal
rules. The primary emphasis is on the form that expert testimony takes
at trial; that is, how far can the expert go in explaining the reasoning
behind and bases for his opinions? Well-rehearsed issues about the
reliability and validity of various expert theories, tests, and techniques
are addressed only where necessary to illuminate the discussion on the
form of expert testimony. Parts III.B. and II.C. closely examine how
the federal rules affected the common law, relying extensively on the
text of the rules and the Advisory Committee's commentary. Part II.B.
assesses how Article VII of the federal rules and several hearsay excep-
tions affected the admissibility of experts' major premises; namely, the
expert's overarching theories along with the tests and techniques that
apply those theories. Part III.C. shifts attention to the minor (case-
specific) premises, which were also reshaped by a number of hearsay
exceptions as well as Rules 703 and 705. In several cases the Advisory
Committee justified the creation of new hearsay exceptions not only
because it found such information sufficiently trustworthy, but because
the Committee believed that limiting instructions were futile and ineffec-
tive. Moreover, the federal rules jettisoned the hypothetical question
requirement in order to reduce the burden on the direct examiner to
painstakingly demonstrate that the expert's opinion rested on admissible
14. See discussion infra part 1ID.
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evidence; the intent was not to invite direct examiners to spill inadmissible
evidence before juries. The argument then, is that, despite their crucial
modifications of the common law, the drafters assumed that other parts
would remain intact. In particular, they assumed that inadmissible
evidence would remain inadmissible and that the direct examiner would
not have license to parade excluded evidence before the jury guised
as data to buttress the expert's opinion.
Part II.D. looks at the controversial operation of Rule 703 in state
and federal practice. Three important issues are addressed. First, we
examine the meaning of "inadmissibility" under Rule 703 together with
its relation to the larger phenomena of "limited admissibility." Although
its antecedents highlighted experts' use of hearsay, Rule 703 has been
construed to reach all forms of inadmissibility, including restrictions
on character evidence. Rule 703, then, has the potential to undo any
exclusionary rule of evidence. Second, we look at the standard of the
expert's "reasonable reliance" under Rule 703 which has been fused
with limited admissibility to permit the introduction of otherwise
inadmissible character and hearsay evidence (for example) for the
ostensible purpose of evaluating only the strength of the expert's
conclusions. Case law has at times muddied the distinction between
two separate issues: What can the expert rely on in reaching conclusions
and what should the jury be told about the expert's bases? The so-called
"liberal approach" to reasonable reliance that gives experts wide latitude
in determining what they themselves use to reach opinions is fully
justified provided it does not intrude upon the judge's domain to control
what the jury (as opposed to the expert) learns about the case-specific
facts. This leads to the final problem of disclosure; that is, how much
and under what circumstances should the jury be told about an expert's
inadmissible basis, even where the expert reasonably relied upon it.
The case law reveals a number of different approaches: (a) the "full
use" option that transforms inadmissible evidence into admissible evidence
through the healing power of expert validation; (b) the "limited use"
option that discloses the information subject to an incomprehensible
instruction; and (c) the exclusionary approach that permits the expert's
opinion but precludes the direct examiner from disclosing the inadmissible
bases before the jury.
Part IR argues that Rules 703 and 705 require three distinct but related
inquiries where experts rely on inadmissible bases. First, why is the
[Vol. 20:.467
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basis inadmissible under the rules? Second, do experts in the field rely
on this type of inadmissible evidence? Third, should the bases be
disclosed to the jury even if experts reasonably rely upon them? In
most cases, the direct examiner should not be permitted to disclose the
inadmissible evidence as a matter of course. Judges might, however,
permit oblique or generic references that omit details about the inadmissi-
ble bases in appropriate cases. Detailed disclosure on direct examination
is usually only appropriate where the evidence is sufficiently necessary
and trustworthy to pass muster under the residual exceptions to the
hearsay rule, a determination that might be assisted by the expert witness's
own insights. Finally, consideration should be given to creating new
hearsay exceptions that deal with recurring instances of reliable informa-
tion used by experts which do not fit easily into existing exceptions.
Thus, limited admissibility should not be allowed to erode the integrity
of the exclusionary rules, turning trials into cynical games in which
the proponent conjures up some illusory "legitimate" use that trumps
an exclusionary rule, the judge instructs the jury accordingly, and we
all pretend that the instruction works.
II. Conceptual Integrity and "Practical
Inconvenience": The Common-Law Background
A. Introduction
In order to understand the operation of Rule 703, one must appreciate
the common-law setting from which it developed. Rule 703, and Article
VII of the Federal Rules of Evidence generally, represented a reaction
to problems involving the use of experts.' The common-law paradigm
embraced two overriding priorities: expert testimony should be used
only where necessary and expert opinions should be based only on
admissible evidence. The result was a straightjacket that purchased
doctrinal elegance at the cost of "practical inconvenience." Ultimately
the allure of expert assistance and practical concerns involved in present-
ing expert testimony eroded the paradigm.
15. See discussion infra parts Ill.B-C.
19971]
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This section understakes a brief survey of the common-law paradigm
governing expert testimony. Part II describes a world unfamiliar to
those educated under the regime of the federal rules. The common law
allowed expert evidence only where it was deemed necessary for the
trier of fact. Moreover, the expert's theories and practices were subject
to stringent standards of reliability. Expert testimony was clearly the
exception in a trial system heavily weighted in favor of lay witnesses
who related their personal knowledge to lay jurors.
The premium on lay witnesses with firsthand knowledge also expressed
the common law's abhorrence of hearsay. Various rules rigidly policed
the form of expert testimony, striving to ensure that the expert's opinion
was predicated on the very same information that a jury would later
consider in reaching a verdict. In short, an expert's opinion had to be
based on admissible evidence, and to enforce this restriction, the common
law relied on either the stilted mechanism of the hypothetical question
or required experts to listen to the same testimony that the jury heard.
Although logically elegant, the common-law paradigm rested on a
variety of fictions and compromises that undercut its efficacy. Modem
society's increasing reliance on expertise in most matters of life led
inexorably to greater use of such specialized knowledge in the courtrooms.
Eventually the doctrinally deft handling of expert hearsay succumbed
not just to the reality of how experts reached their conclusions, but to
the reality of how trial lawyers used rules of evidence in the courtroom.
B. Scope of Expert Testimony at Common Law
To a modem world comfortable with "paradigm shifts" and seemingly
endless disagreements among experts,16 the common-law rules seem
rather quaint and almost naive. Expert testimony was admissible only
where necessary to educate the jury about esoteric subject matter that
arose during the trial.
In his influential late nineteenth-century treatise, The Law of Expert
Testimony,17 Henry Rogers duly observed that questions falling outside
"the range of common experience" required "special knowledge" provided
16. See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFC REVOLUTIONS (2d
ed. enlarged 1970).
17. HENRY WADE ROGERS, THE LAW OF EXPERT TESTIMONY (1991) (2d ed. 1891).
[Vol. 20:467
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by witnesses "skilled in the particular science, art or trade to which
the question relates." 8 Conversely, expert testimony was excluded
"where the subject-matter of inquiry is such that it may be presumed
to lie within the common experience of all men of common education,
moving in the ordinary walks of life."9 In short, experts were welcome,
but only where their assistance was deemed essential. 20
Underlying this rule was an epistemology that assigned the permissible
scope of expert testimony to a middle region lying between the extremes
of common sense and speculation. Dean Mason Ladd explained the
common-law position with characteristic succinctness:
Stated in the negative, expert testimony is not admissible to prove or
disprove matters within common knowledge as to which facts may be
so described that the trier of fact may form a reasonable opinion them-
selves. Furthermore, the issue must be such that the expert may answer
by giving an opinion that is a reasonable probability rather than conjecture
or speculation. 1
The realm of common'sense consisted of what all reasonable persons
were said to know.22 This included matters of common human experi-
18. Id. § 6, at 20.
19. Id. § 8, at 25.
20. See also William Foster, E.pet Tesfimony-Prevalent Complaints and Proposed Remedies,
XIH v.L.REv. 169,175-76 (1897-1898). Foster, a sitting judge, commented on contemporary
criticisms of expert witness testimony. Reaffirming the common-law position that experts are
permitted to testify only when necessary, Foster found support for this doctrine in the notion
that the trier of fact should be afforded the best available evidence in making its decision and
in the requirements of an "advanced civilization." Id. at 176.
21. Mason Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REv. 414, 418-19 (1952). Dean Ladd
also observed:
There is no more certain test for determining when experts may be used than the common
sense inquiry whether the untrained layman would be qualified to determine intelligently
and to the best possible degree the particular issue without enlightenment from those
having a specialized understanding of the subject involved in the dispute. Whenever
the triers of fact are confronted with issues which cannot be determined intelligently
on the basis of ordinary judgment and practical experience gained through the usual
affairs of life, the benefit of scientific or specialized knowledge or experience may
be provided by use of expert testimony.
Id. at 418-19; see also Faust F. Rossi, Modern Evidence and the Expert Witness, 12 Lmo.,
Fall 1985, at 18, 19 ("The expertise had to encompass matters sufficiently complex to be beyond
the ken of the ordinary lay person. Yet it could not be so novel or speculative that it was not
generally accepted within its recognized scientific or professional sphere.").
22. Ladd, supra note 21, at 418-19; see also John H. Mansfield, Jury Notice, 74 GEO.
L.J. 395 (1985).
1997]
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ence acquired through everyday living as well as subjects of general
education. For example, lay jurors were (and still are) expected to detect
liars and sort out conflicting testimony just by virtue of having lived
long enough to qualify for jury duty.23 Jurors were also entrusted with
the conscience of the community. The law of negligence made reason-
ableness an issue for the jury, which was in just as good a position as
any single judge to gauge the community's standard of ordinary care.2
Thus, it was unnecessary to call witnesses to prove facts that were
beyond dispute or within the jury's common knowledge, a practice wisely
followed by today's courts as well. In present terms, then, the realm
of common knowledge is the collection of facts, data, and opinions that
we expect an ordinary eighteen-year-old to know through education
in the home, the schools, and the streets. And as a fall back, the judge
can always take judicial notice and instruct the jury that it must accept
an indisputable fact as established.25
The law of evidence did not open the courthouse doors to every self-
described expert who offered an opinion on a subject deemed outside
the sphere of common knowledge. Expert testimony could not be
predicated on conjecture or speculation. Rather, the expert had to provide
the court with some assurance that the theory, test, or technique was
reliable.26 The common law's vacillations on scientific and technical
reliability are discussed further in the next section.27
In summary, the necessity standard compelled the judge to police
the jagged, ever-fluctuating borders between the realms of popular
knowledge, reliable specialized knowledge (science and technology),
23. Two additional considerations supported the view that jurors were the court's "lie
detectors." First, there was little reason to believe that a judge was much better at the task
than the average juror. Second, despite the legal system's occasional flirtations with scientific
tests of credibility, it is generally conceded that experts can seldom provide direct help on this
issue.
24. See, e.g., ROOERS, supra note 17, § 11 (opinions of witnesses, whether "professional
or unprofessional," on a "theory of morals or duty" were inadmissible).
25. See FED. R. EviD. 201.
26. See, e.g., ROGERS, supra note 17, § 13 (stating that expert opinion may not be based
on "speculative data"). As an example, Rogers discussed a Mississippi case in which the court
excluded expert testimony in a bastardy case on the ground "that it was highly improbable
that impregnation could be produced by the first act of coition." Id. (footnote omitted).
27. See discussion infra part II.C.
[Vol. 20:467
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and speculation.28 The hazards of patrolling the borders were apparent
from the start. Almost one-hundred years ago, treatise writers complained
that the cases were inconsistent and admissibility was "exceedingly
difficult to determine."2 9 Moreover, the elegance of the common-law
model camouflaged the doctrinal mischief wrought by the use of experts.
C. The Form of Expert Testimony at Common Law
The common law of evidence worked best in the simple case. Parties
would call lay witnesses who recounted their first-hand observations.
The lay jury would listen to the witnesses relate what they saw or heard,
then weigh the competing testimony based upon common sense.
Expert witnesses greatly complicated even the simplest case by apply-
ing knowledge that was, by definition, beyond the grasp of the average
lay juror. One expert might be difficult enough to understand, but the
problem intensified when opposing experts clashed over the underlying
scientific or esoteric subject matter. In short, who should the jury believe
when the experts disagreed? And even more troubling was how the
expert witness applied the specialized knowledge to the facts of the
case; in particular, on what version of the facts did the expert rely?
In part for these reasons, Learned Hand concluded that the use of
expert witnesses was "anomalous." 3 An expert was peculiar, reasoned
Hand, because
28. ROGERS, supra note 17, § 9.
29. Id. § 10, at 27.
30. Hand, supra note 1, at 50. Reviewing the earlier cases, Hand found that the anomaly
arose because courts relied heavily on expert witnesses while the rules of evidence were evolving.
Although experts did not fit comfortably with the principles underlying the rules of evidence,
experts were simply too useful to be jettisoned; thus, experts survived as an "exception":
The upshot of this examination [of the case law] seems to be that the use of experts
as witnesses existed when the present exclusive rules of evidence were not yet developed
or enforced, that as the rule excluding the opinions or conclusions of witnesses took
form, the use of experts being established and convenient, remained unaffected when
other opinion evidence disappeared. What I have called the 'exception' which expert
evidence represents is therefore no more than a relic of the usage of an undeveloped
age which had not so far differentiated witness from jury as rigidly to confine each
to its function. The rise of expert testimony is no more than the gradual recognition
of such testimony, amid the gradual definition of rules of evidence, as a permissible,
because supposedly useful, archaism.
Id. at 50.
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he is allowed to testify to his conclusion from the facts, which he has
either himself observed or which are in evidence from the testimony
of others. His position is only peculiar in that a common witness is
forbidden to testify to conclusions, and the history of the origin of expert
witnesses must necessarily be simply the history of the exception in
his favor to the rule that witnesses shall testify only to facts and not
to inferences?'
Put another way, lay witnesses simply related what they saw or heard
on the date in question, but experts came perilously close to telling the
jury how to decide a particular issue. Although Hand focused on the
common law's opinion rule, his critique implicated the bases for the
expert's opinion as well.32
Anticipating the modem conceptualization of expert evidence in terms
of its "syllogistic structure,"' Hand observed that all evidence problems
resolve themselves into considerations of the "major premise" and the
"minor premise." The major premise is the general knowledge that
the jury uses in assessing what the witnesses have said about the particular
facts (the minor premise). 4 Expert testimony also implicated both
premises. As we will see, the common law attempted to control the
content and reliability of the major and the minor premises, issues that
inevitably raised the ugly head of hearsay.
1. The Major Premises
Although jurors' own life experiences and general education comprise
the major premises needed to resolve most factual issues, trial procedure
has never concerned itself with the precise extent of any given jury's
level of common knowledge.m Lawyers probe the venire panel during
31. Id. at 43-44. Hand was reacting against the arcane distinction between fact and opinion.
Sixty years later, McCormick railed against the same distinction in the first edition of his influential
evidence treatise. CHARLES T. MCCoRMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 11,
at 22 (1st ed. 1954) [hereinafter McCORMICK I].
32. Hand, supra note 1, at 40.
33. See Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 353-54.
34. See Hand, supra note 1, at 51.
35. See Mansfield, supra note 22, at 397-98.
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jury selection, but once impaneled, legal fictions determine what any
given jury knows about general matters. As prime examples of common
knowledge, Hand pointed to assessments of witness's credibility and
gauging the accuracy of admissions against interest. 36
When necessary for the understanding of esoteric or specialized
information, the common law permitted expert witnesses to supplement
the jury's reservoir of knowledge.37 On such issues, observed Hand,
the expert "takes the jury's place and contributes the major premise."
Hand feared, however, that when experts disagreed over which major
premises applied, the lay jury would be left adrift over which to
choose.39
As an example, Hand offered a hypothetical slander case involving
an allegedly forged note where the parties each offered a different kind
of expert.4° One party offered a handwriting expert who testified that
where the "angle of inclination" is identical in two different handwriting
samples, the same person wrote both.4' The other party, however,
offered a doctor who described the symptoms of alcoholic tremors, which
matched evidence about the party's behavior, and further testified that
a person with alcoholic tremors cannot even hold a pen.42 Thus, each
party offered a different brand of science to make its point.43
Should a jury accept the major premises offered by the handwriting
expert or those of the physician? Hand offered no answer, but cautioned
that "the only important thing to notice is that the expert has taken the
jury's place if they believe him." 44 Hand's ultimate solution was to
scrap the use of expert witnesses and spare juries the onerous task of
blindly deciding between dueling major premises.'
36. Hand, supra note 1, at 51. Both examples are still valid.
37. Id. at 55.
38. Id. at 51.
39. Id. at 52.
40. Id. at 51.
41. Hand, supra note 1, at 51.
42. Id. at 52.
43. Id. at 51-52.
44. Id. at 52.
45. Id. at 56.
197
HeinOnline  -- 20 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 481 1996-1997
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TRIAL ADVOCACY[
Despite Hand's skepticism, the common law trusted the juries' ability
to sort out conflicting major premises, but developed a variety of
mechanisms to ensure that the experts offered reliable evidence.46
Elaborate rules stud the early cases concerning the precise verbal form
that the expert's opinion had to take, the professional pedigree of the
underlying theory, test, or technique, and the expert's qualifications.
Some cases sought to ensure reliability through the dubious device
of requiring that opinions take certain verbal forms. 47 More precisely,
an expert was required to state an opinion to a requisite degree of
certainty, literally wording his testimony in terms of "reasonable probabili-
ties" instead of conjecture or speculation.' s The case law was replete
with condemnations of witnesses who offered speculative possibilities
in lieu of professional "certainty."'49 Yet this procedure offered only
thin protection at best. Experienced witnesses knew the preferred
phrasing; thus, the verbal forms provided little assurance of reliability
beyond the witness's glib insistence that his opinion was sufficiently
certain.s° Verbal formalism, then, served as the surrogate for reliability.
Besides policing the verbal formulas used to describe opinions, courts
also searched for objective criteria that gauged the prevailing state of
the art. The Frye test51 equated reliability with general acceptance
by the appropriate scientific or technical community. The Frye standard's
46. See generally Hand, supra note 1.
47. See generally Ladd, supra note 21, at 415, and cases cited therein.
48. Id. at 419.
49. See ROGERS, supra note 17, § 13, at 33-35.
50. As early as the 1820s medical experts warned other medical experts, usually without
effect, to guard against overstating their findings while testifying. JAMES C. MOHR, DoCTORs
AND THE LAW: MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 98 (1993). Mohr
further observes that the absence of licensure requirements, the lack of formal medical training,
and "deep-seated disagreements over what constituted effective health care" created a situation
in which "[u]ntrained practitioners whom serious medical jurisprudents held in contempt were
thus afforded an open and equal chance to persuade juries to cling to folk perceptions and
superficial appearances over often arcane and difficult-to-explain scientific conclusions." Id.
at 100. By the 1850s, courtroom confrontations between noisome medical experts had become
a "major problem." Id. at 101.
51. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). For the leading discussion of
the Frye standard, see Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye
v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLuM. L. REv. 1197 (1980).
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deficiencies have been brilliantly and elaborately exposed for decades,
but the test still retains widespread popularity. 2
Although the authorities were split over the imposition of rigid verbal
formulas or requirements of general acceptance, all courts demanded
a showing that the expert was qualified to testify s3 Just as the common-
law judge ruled on the competency of lay witnesses to testify, the judge
also decided whether the expert possessed adequate credentials to provide
the necessary assistance. In effect, the resume served as a surrogate
for the reliability of the expert's testimony. Absent a stipulation to the
witness's qualifications, the direct examiner always began by eliciting
the witness's experience or education. Opposing counsel could conduct
a "preliminary cross-examination" on the witness's qualifications in
the event that a serious question arose about his competence. 54
Judges had discretion in determining the expert's competence to
testify.55 An expert could qualify through experience or education.
Ideally, an expert exhibited both. Where expertise turned primarily
on the witness's experiences, the critical concern was the fit between
the facts of the case and the expert's experiences. 56
Experts who qualified primarily through study were greeted with
skepticism. S7 Henry Rogers warned in Expert Testimony that "a witness
cannot testify as an expert on a particular matter when that particular
matter does not pertain to his special calling or profession, and his
knowledge of the subject of inquiry has been derived from study
alone."' Rogers also observed:
It is the doctrine of the courts that study of a matter without practical
experience in regard to it may qualify a witness as an expert.... It
52. The literature on the Frye test is enormous. See generally Giannelli, supra note 51.
In the early 1950s McCormick advocated "general acceptance" as an appropriate criteria for
taking judicial notice of the reliability of a test or technique, but criticized its applicability
to "novel" scientific evidence, suggesting further that many courts followed what is today called
the "relevancy" approach. McCoRMIcK L supra note 31, § 170, at 363.
53. ROGERS, supra note 17, § 15.
54. Id. § 17.
55. Id. § 16.
56. Id. § 18.
57. Id. § 19, at 46.
58. ROGERS, supra note 17, § 19, at 46.
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would be most unwise to recognize the principle that a person might
qualify himself to testify as an expert in a particular case, merely by
devoting himself to a study of the authorities for the purpose of giving
such testimony, when such reading and study is not in the line of his
special calling or profession'
These passages reveal two primary concerns. First, parties might literally
construct an expert witness by asking the person to read up on a certain
subject solely for the purpose of offering favorable testimony.60 To
be sure, this fear also reflected the courts' bitterly frustrating experience
in sorting out qualified medical experts from the ranks of charlatans,
schemers, and quacks-a truly hopeless task in a time where healers
were not regulated by licensing requirements or subject to formal
educational standards."' Similarly, the courts also feared that such
experts served merely as hearsay conduits.62 A witness who simply
read about a subject might do little more than paraphrase ("parrot" or
regurgitate are less polite ways to put it) what others have said or written.
To a great extent, then, experts posed tremendous problems because
they reeked of hearsay. Experts who qualified through personal experi-
ence presented fewer problems because their specialized knowledge
was largely a composite of other firsthand experiences. But experts
who learned through study-that is, what they had read in books, articles,
or journals or had heard from others-formed their major premises
primarily through hearsay. In his 1899 revision of Greenleafon Evidence,
John Henry Wigmore conceded that medical experts' qualifications arose
from hearsay, but concluded that it was "absurd" to deny "judicial
standing to such knowledge.""
59. Id.
60. This practice is fully acceptable under the Federal Rules of Evidence. See 1 CHARLES
TuFORD MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 13, at 53-58 (John W. Strong et al. eds.,
4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter MCCORMICK II].
61. See MOHR, supra note 50, at 99-100.
62. See ROGERS, supra note 17, § 19.
63. 1 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF EVIDENCE § 430(L), at 529 (John
Henry Wigmore ed., 16th ed. 1899) [hereinafter GREENLEAF ON EVIDENCE]. Wigmore opted
for the pragmatic approach over the hypertechnical treatment of hearsay:
It will usually be the case that the medical or surgical witness has acquired the greater
part of his knowledge of professional matters in general from hearsay,--both from
the data recorded in books and journals and from his professional instructors. It would
[Vol. 20:467
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In short, experts created intractable hearsay problems; the only issue
was how to handle the hearsay. Should the jury be directly exposed
to the fruits of the study, or should the fruits be mashed into an unrecog-
nizable pulp that represented a less serious affront to rules that ostensibly
excluded hearsay?
The common law chose the pulp fiction. Summarizing the doctrinal
landscape in the 1890s, Rogers distinguished between the "exact" and
the "inexact" sciences." Books and articles in the exact sciences were
admissible, but such writings were limited to "almanacs, astronomical
calculations, tables of logarithms, mortuary tables for estimating the
probable duration of life at a given age, tables of weights and measures,
and of currency, chronological tables, interest tables, and annuity
tables."' Nor did this practice offend the hearsay rule. Some of this
material provided a basis for judicial notice while other writings "received
in evidence are not used strictly as evidence, but rather for the purpose
of refreshing the memory of the court and the jury. '"6 (Undoubtedly,
nineteenth-century jurors must have been relieved that their civic duty
did not necessitate relearning logarithm tables in advance of trial.)
The inexact sciences, including medicine, received a far chillier
reception. The majority rule in England and the United States flatly
excluded the admissibility of books, journals, or articles as proof of
their contents.67 The law closely guarded against subterfuges designed
to circumvent the general rule of inadmissibility, particularly where
the expert's qualifications were based on study as opposed to personal
experience.
be absurd to deny judicial standing to such knowledge, because all scientific data must
be handed down from generation to generation by hearsay, and each student can hope
to test only a trifling fraction of scientific truth by personal experience.
Id. Further elaborating upon "judicial standing," Wigmore clearly distinguished between using
the hearsay statement as a basis for the doctor's opinion from the "different question" of admitting
the "hearsay statements themselves." Id. at 530.
64. ROGERS, supra note 17, § 163, at 391.
65. Id.
66. Id. § 163, at 393-94 (emphasis added).
67. Id. § 166, at 398. Rogers summarized English decisions as well as cases from California,
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, New Hampshire,
New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin as conforming to the majority rule.
See id. §§ 167-173. Iowa and Alabama adhered to a majority position that allowed the witness
to read from the treatise. Id. § 165.
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On direct examination the expert could refresh his recollection by
reading an authoritative treatise to himself, but any opinion testimony
had to be the expert's own conclusion, not that of the treatise writer.68
The expert was also permitted to "state the source" of any opinion based
on study, but it was "improper... to testify what such work contains
or says.""
Cross-examination was similarly restricted.7" Impeachment by
contradiction was permitted only where the witness referred during his
testimony to a work that did not support his opinion: "In other words
the authorities which an expert has been allowed to cite in his testimony
may be put in evidence for the purpose of contradicting or discrediting
him as to opinions expressed by him on their authority. 71 If the expert
did not specifically cite a supporting work, the work could not be used
to impeach his testimony. 2 Moreover, some jurisdictions precluded
even this truncated opportunity to impeach with contradicting treatises."
Thus, the form of the evidence was critical. Whether on direct or
cross-examination, lawyers could not evade the ban through the subterfuge
of reading excerpts to the witness and asking whether he agreed. Indeed,
Rogers dismissed such practices as "reprehensible."74 The authorities
were less consistent on the propriety of counsel reading from such works
during argument, but England and a number of states banned this as
well.7s Rogers clearly disapproved of lawyers reading from treatises
because a contrary rule effectively nullified the books' inadmissibility.'
68. Id. § 162, at 390, § 177, at 409. Rogers observed that "a marked distinction exists
between permitting a witness to refresh his memory by reference to an authority or writing,
and the introduction of the writing itself in evidence." Id. § 162, at 390.
69. ROGERS, supra note 17, § 177, at 409.
70. Id. § 178, at 410.
71. Id. § 176, at 408.
72. Id.
73. See id. § 176, at 408 n.4 (citing Davis v. State, 38 Md. 15, 36 (1873) and State v.
O'Brien, 7 R.I. 336, 338 (1862), cases in which treatises were excluded even for contradiction
purposes).
74. ROGERS, supra note 17, § 178, at 410.
75. Id. §§ 180-81.
76. Id. § 181, at 413. Rogers concluded that, in cases permitting the reading of treatises
during argument, "counsel really obtains from it all the benefits of substantive evidence fortified
by its 'standard' character." Id.
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Sound reasons supported the rule of inadmissibility. First, treatises
in the inexact sciences often contained evanescent opinions which were
changed with new research."7 In short, how could the court tell whether
the book's opinions were current? Second, there was no practical way
to distinguish the "result of original research" from more "speculative"
compilations." Third, the books themselves were hearsay because
the authors were not under oath or subject to cross-examination. 9
Finally, books contained generalized statements that did not address
the facts of a particular case, unlike the expert witness who was subject
to examination.8 In sum, by filtering opinions in books through expert
testimony they "'lose their independent substantive character as
books."' 81
As we will see, as late as the 1950s little had changed.82 The law
grudgingly acknowledged that much of an expert's qualifications "'derived
from inadmissible sources."'83 However, jurors were not let in on
the dirty secret. Instead, the expert testified as though his knowledge
of the underlying theory or test sprang from personal knowledge and
experience rather than hearsay. The hope was that "errors" in the
background facts canceled each other out, producing a "reliable aggre-
gate.'" 4
2. The Minor Premises
The common law did not confine expert witnesses to sterile lectures
about their field of specialization, but expected that they would apply
their expertise to the facts of the case in the form of opinions.85 To
77. Id. § 174, at 405.
78. Id.
79. ROGERS, supra note 17, § 174, at 405.
80. Id.
81. Id. (quoting WHARTON'S EVIDENCE § 665). In stating the rationale behind the rule,
Rogers relied entirely on Wharton. Wharton's arguments are paraphrased and reordered here.
82. See discussion infra part II.D.1.
83. John M. Maguire & Jefferson E. Hahesy, Requisite Proof of Basis for Expert Opinion,
5 VAND. L. REV. 432,437 (1952) (quoting Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. New Bedford, 56 N.E.
288, 290 (1900)).
84. Id. at 438.
85. Hand, supra note 1.
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use Learned Hand's terminology, the expert not only supplied the major
premises but also applied them to the minor premises.86 As outlined
in the preceding section, the law of evidence cloaked the substantial
hearsay problems posed by the major premises through the fiction that
a qualified expert could testify as though he had personal knowledge
of all the information and facts contained in countless books, articles,
lectures, and discussions. In short, the expert's reliance on at least some
hearsay was inextricably bound up with the expert's qualifications.
Some accommodation with the hearsay rule was both essential and
inevitable.
Far more serious was the evidentiary status of the case-specific
information (i.e., Hand's minor premises) relied upon by the expert in
reaching his opinion. If reliance by experts on inadmissible hearsay
was an inevitable part of their qualifications, this was not true of the
case-specific information. After all, the rules of evidence closely and
jealously controlled how and what the jury learned about the facts of
the case.
The common-law rules subjected experts-at least in theory-to the
same constraints as the jury. An expert's opinion had to be predicated
upon admissible evidence of the specific facts; it could not be based
on inadmissible evidence. 7 The court needed the expert's assistance
because the subject matter was beyond the ken of the average person,
but the expert's province lay only in applying his specialized knowledge
to the particular facts. And the jury was just as capable as the expert
in deciding what those case-specific facts were, particularly where they
turned on issues of credibility.
The rationale was obvious, elegant, and logical. What good was the
expert's opinion, then, unless both the expert and the jury concurred
in what was said or done in this specific case? The common law
developed a series of procedural devices that policed the case-specific
basis for the expert's opinion. The rules distinguished opinions based
on the expert's personal knowledge from opinions based on assumed
facts (i.e., hypotheticals).
86. Id.
87. ROGERS, supra note 17, § 36; MCCORMICK I, supra note 31, §§ 14-15.
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Personal knowledge embraced those specific facts about which the
expert had firsthand knowledge, such as a physician who conducted
a personal examination of the patient's physical condition. The expert's
personal knowledge did not embrace hearsay; that is, what others told
the expert about what happened.88 In this sense, the expert served
in a dual capacity, testifying as a lay witness about firsthand observations
while at the same time assuming the role of expert by applying specialized
knowledge to the mundane observations. To ensure that the expert's
opinion rested only on relevant personal observations, the rules required
that the expert describe those observations before stating an opinion.
Thus, Rogers proclaimed that it was improper to ask an expert "for an
opinion based on facts which he has not given in evidence." 9 Nor
did the law soften easily on this point. Even as late as the 1950s,
McCormick reported that some courts still required the expert to disclose
his personal knowledge before offering an opinion, although others left
prior disclosure to the trial judge's discretion.90
The law was even less accommodating where the expert lacked
personal knowledge. To ensure that the expert's case-specific basis
coincided with the jury's version of the events, two procedures arose.
First, the lawyers could supply the necessary information by asking
the expert witness to assume the truth of certain facts-the hypothetical
question. The assumed facts might consist of only a part of the evidence
because counsel was entitled to frame the hypothetical based on "his
theory of them."9' Moreover, the assumed facts might include those
in hot dispute, so long as there was evidence "tending" to prove them.92
Second, the expert could listen to the same testimony as the jury. Rules
exempted expert witnesses from sequestration requirements and permitted
them to be called after lay witnesses had testified, thus allowing the
expert to take the witness stand after having listened to the same evidence
88. ROGERS, supra note 17, § 36, at 83 (an expert's opinion was inadmissible if based
on facts which he heard outside the courtroom and which he believed were credible).
89. Id. § 36, at 82.
90. McCoRmicK I, supra note 31, § 14, at 29-30.
91. ROGERS, supra note 17, § 27, at 65.
92. Id. § 27, at 68.
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as the jury.93 This did not, however, relieve the proponent of the burden
of framing a hypothetical question.94 The hypothetical was still neces-
sary to identify the precise bases for the expert's opinion, except where
the lay testimony was undisputed or extremely brief.95
Whether the expert listened to the testimony or was fed a version
of the evidence by the lawyers, the assumed facts of the hypothetical
question served several valuable doctrinal functions. First, by rigidly
identifying the expert's minor premises as "assumptions," the rule flagged
juries to the contingent nature of the expert's ultimate opinion and the
juries' own responsibility for deciding what happened in the particular
case. Reflecting worries about jury autonomy and an obeisance to a
distinction between fact and opinion that are alien to modem law, Rogers
explained that the expert must be given "'no occasion or opportunity
to decide upon the evidence, or mingle his own opinion of the facts."'
Second, and more importantly, the device ensured that the expert's opinion
was based only on admissible evidence. Because the assumed facts
preceded the expert's opinion, the judge and opposing counsel could
immediately discern if the opinion to follow was fatally infected with
inadmissible evidence.97
93. Id. § 24, at 58-59.
94. Id. § 27, at 64.
95. Id. § 28, at 70 (noting it was "improper" for experts to base an opinion on "memory"
where the prior testimony was not in "harmony" or "voluminous'). Rogers also observed that
the jury must be apprised of the opinion's basis because its value turned, in part, on whether
the opinion was based on "false assumptions or on existing facts." Id.
96. ROGERS, supra note 17, § 28, at 68-69 (quoting Fairchild v. Bascomb, 35 Vt. 398,
415 (1862)).
97. Only on cross-examination could a lawyer inquire into assumed facts that were not
supported by the evidence. In theory, this line of cross-examination only tested the expert's
skill or accuracy. ROGERS, supra note 17, § 33, at 79. The rigidity of the hypothetical question
doctrine is further illustrated by the rule precluding an expert from taking into account the
earlier opinion testimony of another expert witness. Writing over sixty years apart, both Dean
Rogers and Professor McCormick clarified that a hypothetical question could not include the
"opinions" of other experts. Id. § 30; McCORMncK L supra note 31, § 14, at 30-31. McCormick
was particularly adamant Although experts undoubtedly considered "previously expressed
opinions of other experts" in rendering their own "private opinion," testifying to such opinions
was an entirely different matter. Once on the witness stand, the expert was asked to assume
the truth of the earlier opinions, "and if he does this his own opinion may then be but an academic
echo." MCCoRMICK I, supra note 31, § 14, at 31.
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D. Hearsay and the Common-Law Conundrum
on the Eve of the Federal Rules
As we have seen, under common-law practice expert witnesses offered
opinions based on their own personal knowledge or on hypothetical
facts offered by the attorneys. Ideally, all of the minor premises support-
ing the opinion rested on admissible evidence. The reality was something
different. Courts resorted to a variety of compromises, fictions, and
outright distortions to accommodate expert testimony, all of which placed
enormous strain on the doctrinal superstructure. Courts experimented
with rules of limited admissibility, ersatz hearsay exceptions, and
nondisclosure of the basis of the experts' opinion in an effort to reconcile
trial practice with evidentiary doctrine." The end result was an unduly
technical, cumbersome, crazy-quilt of ad hoc rules and doctrinal patch-
work.
By the 1950s and 1960s the cases and commentators had identified
three primary pressure points,99 and because all three were specifically
addressed in the Federal Rules of Evidence, they provide an important
perspective from which to appreciate the rationale underlying the new
rules. The first was experts' reliance on treatises, journals, professional
standards, and the like in formulating opinions.' ° Many of these cases
involved medical experts, who raised a second recurring problem; namely,
the evidentiary status of patients' statements describing present or past
symptoms or medical history.10 1 Finally, experts of all types increasing-
ly relied on reports or test results which were usually prepared by other
technicians, thus creating an additional layer of hearsay.10 2
The discussion below examines each of these three areas and compares
the views of two commentators: Charles McCormick in the first edition
of his evidence handbook'0 3 and Paul Rheingold, the author of an
98. See Paul D. Rheingold, The Basis of Medical Testimony, 15 VAND. L. REV. 473, 473
n.2 (1962).
99. See id.
100. See discussion infra part II.D.1.
101. See discussion infra part lI.D.2.
102. See discussion infra part II.D.3.
103. McCoRMICK I, supra note 31, § 14, at 31.
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in-depth article on expert medical witnesses.1°4 Writing in 1954 and
1962, respectively, their analyses capture the state of the law on the
eve of the Advisory Committee's work on the federal rules: More
importantly, McCormick's and Rheingold's works greatly influenced
the Advisory Committee's approach to experts' use of hearsay.
1. An Expert's Reliance on Treatises, Journals, etc.
Since the nineteenth century it had been conceded that an experts'
qualifications more often than not rested on hearsay.'l 5 In the first
edition of his evidence treatise, in 1954, McCormick surveyed a doctrinal
landscape that closely resembled the terrain scouted by Rogers in the
1890s.106 The courts escaped the hearsay straightjacket in several
ways. The simplest approach pretended that the hearsay problem did
not exist; thus, qualified experts intoned opinions that, while based on
inadmissible hearsay, appeared to originate with the witness.
Another method was to expand the orbit of the expert's personal
knowledge to include scientific principles and facts as well as general
medical knowledge, statistics, testing protocols, and other methodolo-
gy.107 Inflating the experts' personal knowledge accomplished two
things. First, it conveniently, though illogically, evaded the hearsay
problem. Second, it also liberated such experts from the strictures of
the hypothetical question rule because an expert's personal knowledge
did not have to be presented as an assumed fact to the jury. However,
the reclassification of this background hearsay as personal knowledge
left an unresolved problem. Because experts were permitted to describe
the personal knowledge that supported their opinions, did it follow that
they could read from or paraphrase such texts?
As we have seen, late nineteenth-century law forbade such eva-
sions.1l 8 Evidence law in the mid-twentieth century was murkier.
Judges and commentators unanimously agreed that experts could testify
104. Rheingold, supra note 98.
105. See 1 GREENLEAF ON EVIDENCE, supra note 63, § 430(J).
106. MCCORMICK I, supra note 31, § 14, at 30-31.
107. Rheingold, supra note 98, at 486.
108. See discussion supra part II.C.1.
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to opinions based "upon knowledge gained from books and treatises, ' 1 9
but vigorously disputed the form that such testimony could assume.
McCormick observed that there was still no general hearsay exception
for learned treatises."n Narrow exceptions existed for the exact scienc-
es: "market reports of current prices in journals used by the trade,
recognized business registers and city directories, and mortality and
annuity tables used by life insurance companies." ''
To be sure, the common law evinced glacial change. McCormick
contended that "[t]he disinterestedness and reliability of standard scientific
treatises or authoritative works in any field of scholarship would seem
equally to warrant their use before a jury as evidence of the truth of
their statements."" Yet by 1954, only one court had accepted this
argument while several other state statutes allowed treatises to prove
"facts of general notoriety and interest."'
On cross-examination the expert could be impeached with contradicting
authorities, but the treatise could only be read for the purpose of testing
the soundness of the expert's opinion and only where the witness
conceded that the opinion-given on direct examination-was based
in whole or in part on that authority." 4 A substantial minority of
courts further restricted such impeachment to instances where the expert
cited the authority during the direct examination (as opposed to acknowl-
edging during cross-examination that the opinion given on direct was
predicated on the book or treatise).1
In a 1962 article surveying the landscape of expert medical evidence,
Rheingold laid out an approach that ultimately influenced the contours
of Rule 703.116 Labeling his approach the doctrine of "expert valida-
109. MCCORMICK I, supra note 31, § 296, at 620.
110. Id. § 296, at 621 ("The courts generally, however, have declined to sanction a broad
exception to the hearsay rule for standard treatises as such." (footnote omitted)). Today, nearly
thirty-six states recognize a general exception for learned treatises modeled upon, or inspired
by, Federal Rule 803(18). Index & Tables, WEINSTEIN, supra note 8, at T-136 to 139.
111. MCCORMCK I, supra note 31, § 296, at 620-21.
112. Id. § 296, at 621 (footnotes omitted).
113. Id. (quoting 6 JoHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1693). McCormick further observed
that these statutes did not embrace medical or scientific treatises. Id. § 296, at 621 n.10.
114. Id. § 296, at 620.
115. Id. § 296, at 620 n.3.
116. Rheingold, supra note 98.
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tion,"41 7 Rheingold argued that a doctor should be permitted "to rely
in court upon what he has read and relied on in his private practice."'' s
Put another way, whatever information the doctor "routinely" relies
on in practicing medicine was an appropriate basis for the doctor's opin-
ion." 9 The expert validation doctrine had its genesis, according to
Rheingold, in Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.'s decision in Finnegan
v. Fall River Gas Works Co.'" Moreover, it "spread from authoritative,
standard treatises to journals, statistical records (including life expectancy
tables), the results of experiments, and even to information on how to
perform tests."' Although praising this "simple concept" because
it provided "the rationale for allowing reliance on many types of medical
and nonmedical evidence that might otherwise be barred as hearsay," 2
Rheingold carefully noted that the courts disagreed on its rationale.'
Some justified the idea on "need," others enshrined it as a "hearsay
exception," and some labeled it a device for refreshing recollection or
disingenuously minimized the evidence as only "'amplifying' or 'cor-
roborating' an opinion which the doctor already holds."' Rheingold
rooted expert validation in the reality of how doctors practiced medicine,
especially their professional and ethical standards:
The simplest and most satisfactory solution to the various problems
presented in this article, it is believed, lies in a policy of according to
the physician free reliance upon medical material which he believes
to be germane to the opinion which he is asked to offer. As has been
repeatedly pointed out, the expert is competent to ascertain the reliability
of statements and reports of others and to use only what is relevant
117. Id. at 531. "Expert validation" had been broached earlier by other commentators.
See generally Maguire & Hahesy, supra note 83. McCormick also supported a version of expert
validation. See infra text accompanying notes 149-88.
118. Rheingold, supra note 98, at 485.
119. Id. at 486.
120. 159 Mass. 311, 34 N.E. 523 (1893).
121. Rheingold, supra note 98, at 483-84 (footnotes omitted). As discussed in the following
two subsections, parts II.D.2-3, expert validation extended to other kinds of hearsay, including
statements and reports prepared by investigators or other technicians.
122. Id. at 484.
123. Id.
124. Id. Rheingold concurred that none of this jumble was "particularly illuminating."
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HeinOnline  -- 20 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 494 1996-1997
FEDERaL RULE OF EVIDEN CE 703
and trustworthy. The concept, simply put, is that the doctor validates
what he uses. He follows a process scientifically ingrained. he analyzes
what he hears, casts out what seems inaccurate, pulls together the rest
and reaches an opinion and course of action.'
In short, the qualified medical expert could freely rely on anything the
witness deemed appropriate. The doctor, not the judge, validated the
bases.
Expert validation further implied that the doctor could describe the
basis so that the jury better understood the expert's conclusions.
Rheingold rejected crabbed readings of Finnegan that barred disclosing
the basis to the jury while tolerating the opinion testimony built upon
it.lm Doctors should be permitted to "paraphrase and perhaps read
some parts directly if they happen to have the book along with them."''27
125. Id. at 532 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
126. Rheingold, supra note 98, at 483. In particular, Rheingold quoted the following passage
from Finnegan:
[A]lthough it might not be admissible merely to repeat what a witness had read in
a book, not itself admissible, still, when one who is competent on the general subject
accepts from his reading as probably true, a matter of detail which he had not verified,
the fact gains an authority which it would not have had from the printed page alone,
and, subject, perhaps, to the exercise of some discretion, may be admitted.
Id. at 483 (quoting Finnegan v. Fall River Gas Works Co., 34 N.E. 523 (1893)). Rheingold
disagreed with Maguire's restrictive readings of Finnegan and National Bank of Commerce
v. New Bedford, 56 N.E. 288 (1900), another Holmes opinion that mirrored Finnegan. See
Maguire & Hahesy, supra note 83, at 437-38. Criticizing both Maguire and another commentator,
Hughes, Rheingold argued.
Is there an ambiguity in Justice Holmes' terse prose? Apparently there is, for Professor
Maguire reads it as being as much a red light as a green one. The doctor may "rely"
but he may not restate. When a Massachusetts evidence teacher, Hughes, gets to the
case it is almost all red light. The case is a "blanket rejection of proof of underlying
hearsay when offered in support of expert evidence." Hughes says that while Holmes
had in mind that a doctor could refer to what he read, he could not, under the guise
of fortifying his opinion, read it into evidence. It is submitted that both professors
have read Finnegan and National Bank too narrowly. They have constructed a dichotomy
between mere reference and reading under the guise. But note that many gradations
in use exist. What most doctors do in fact is something in between: they paraphrase
and perhaps read some parts directly if they happen to have the book along with them.
If they, or their counsel more likely, are seeking to create evidence, the judge will
intercede; this is what Holmes meant by "discretion".... Certainly it was not meant
that the doctor should do no more than state the type of basis.
Rheingold, supra note 98, at 483 n.51 (citations omitted).
127. Rheingold, supra note 98, at 483 n.51.
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If lawyers attempted to "create evidence," the judge had the discretion
to "intercede." Cases that allowed the doctor to render his opinion
but precluded him from "recit[ing] the material deemed improper"
manifested "a distrust for the jury which can be settled by proper
instructions." 9 There was but one "sensible" approach: "allow the
basis if the opinion is allowed, and to strike the whole opinion if it lacks
a proper basis."' ' In short, free reliance meant free disclosure of
the expert's basis to the jury subject only to a limiting instruction.
Unfortunately, Rheingold offered no guidance on what such an instruction
would say or how judges would detect when lawyers were attempting
to create evidence.
2. Statements by Patients to Physicians
Statements made by patients to doctors formed a second flashpoint.
In the late nineteenth century, the general rule was clear: experts' opinions
could not be based on unswom out-of-court statements. 131 The rule
was, however, inapplicable to treating physicians, who were permitted
to testify to statements or narratives by the patient regarding conditions,
symptoms, sensations, and feelings, whether past or present. 32 Despite
128. Id. Rheingold further explained:
Another set of cases involve the situation where the medical authorities are directly
(and often at length) read to the trier of the fact, either by the doctor in upholding
his opinion or by the lawyer in examining his witness. A few decisions have upheld
the practice, finding it no different from the common situation of reliance already
discussed. But other courts have condemned the practice, distinguishing it from the
Finnegan situation on the ground that here the book is virtually being made independent
evidence. These views can be readily reconciled by a rule according discretion to
the judge to refuse reliance where it is patently an attempt to introduce the book into
evidence but to allow it where it is in fact merely being read to indicate basis.
Id. at 484-85 (footnotes omitted). Left unexplained is how the judge is to distinguish the one
situation from the other, or what was meant by "refusing reliance." Did this mean that the
opinion could not rest on the basis, or only that the basis could not be "disclosed" to the jury
for the limited purpose of explaining the expert's reasoning?
129. Id. at 478.
130. Id. Rheingold concluded that the "greater weight of cases and commentators" supported
this view. Id. at 478 (footnote omitted).
131. ROGERS, supra note 17, § 46.
132. Id. § 47, at 116.
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this latitude, the treating doctor could not relate statements about the
patient's history or the cause of the injury.L The exception's justifica-
tion turned on the treating doctor's need for, and reliance upon, such
statements in offering treatment. The cases split over whether non-treating
physicians should be accorded the same latitude. L 4
Writing in the 1950s, McCormick detected an environment more
favorably disposed toward statements made by patients to treating
physicians. A universal hearsay exception existed for a patient's
statements of presently existing conditions, including subjective symptoms,
to a treating physician. Although some jurisdictions now extended
the exception to past symptoms, only a minority included the patient's
history describing the general character or external source of the injury
when pertinent to treatment."16
Courts continued, however, to shun patients' statements to non-treating
physicians. Most did not permit statements describing the patient's
present pain or symptoms as substantive evidence. 13' Non-treating
physicians could base their opinions on such history along with their
firsthand observations, but the patient's statements themselves were
"merely explanatory of the opinion."' 38 And a minority of jurisdictions
refused to allow a non-treating physician to disclose any inadmissible
hearsay and further barred the doctor's opinion when it was based only
on "subjective" facts." 9
McCormick's survey, then, revealed evidentiary rules that favored
treating physicians not only by allowing their opinions, but also by
permitting substantive use of a wide array of statements made to them
133. Id. Wigmore concurred, recognizing that because the patient's "life and death" turned
on such statements, courts require "no stricter rule." 1 GREENLEAF ON EVIDENCE, supra note
63, § 430(L), at 529. The statements could only be used to explain the doctor's opinion unless
the statements were admissible under some hearsay exception. Id. § 403(L), at 530.
134. ROGERS, supra note 17, § 47; see also 1 GREENLEAF ON EVIDENCE, supra note 63,
§ 162b, at 255-57.
135. MCCORMICK I, supra note 31, § 266, at 563.
136. Id. § 266, at 564. Foreshadowing federal Rule 803(4) (statements made for purposes
of medical diagnosis or opinion), the minority that allowed the patient's history describing
the injury's external cause or general character did not include statements of "fault." Id.
137. Id. § 267, at 565.
138. Id.
139. Id. § 267, at 566.
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by their patients.' 4 Non-treating physicians received a less favorable
reception, but the law still permitted their opinions and most courts
allowed disclosure of patients statements as explanatory-although it
was unclear what exactly such statements explained.14'
Where McCormick detected clearly emerging rules and grounds for
optimism in 1954, Rheingold saw chaos and confusion in the law's
handling of patients' statements to doctors in 1962. There was, according
to Rheingold, "no simple consensus of courts allowing a physician,
regardless of type, to rely on a patient's statements, regardless of type,
for the stated, limited purpose of demonstrating the basis of his testimo-
ny.1A 42 In trying to make sense of the cases, Rheingold looked at
the type of doctor involved (treating or non-treating), the timing of the
statement relative to the litigation, the declarant's motive in making
the statement, the subject matter (present or past symptoms, history of
the injury, etc.), and other factors. 43 He found that the cases demon-
strated a "diversity of rules" and proclaimed that those which restricted
a doctor's "use of patient statements [were] out of step with reality and
a divergence from sound medical practice."'"4 Rheingold closed by
noting the anomaly that malpractice concerns compelled doctors and
their assistants to take patient histories and rely upon them in treatment
and diagnosis.4s Thus, it followed that "[i]f the courts were in fact
to exclude the statements which they call improper, there would be
virtually no medical evidence heard in court."'"4
140. MCCORMICK I, supra note 31, § 267, at 566.
141. Id. (expressing doubts as to the wisdom of applying the testimony of treating and non-
treating physicians differently, except when being admitted for purposes of present pain or
symptoms).
142. Rheingold, supra note 98, at 494. Rheingold singled out McCormick, along with
three A.L.R. commentators, as guilty of overstating the case-law consensus. Id. at 494 n. 123.
He conceded, however, that there was "an extremely strong, well-reasoned line of cases which
favorably distinguish such use as basis for use as independent evidence." Id. at 494 (footnote
omitted).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 503.
145. Id.
146. Id. (footnote omitted).
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3. Reports and Tests Prepared by Technicians
The third flashpoint involved a doctor's reliance on tests or reports
prepared by others, such as laboratory technicians. Reflecting perhaps
the simpler, relatively unspecialized nature of late nineteenth-century
medical practice, 47 Rogers lumped the statements of other physicians
into the category of inadmissible hearsay that could not be used as a
basis for a testifying physician's opinion:
The rule is that an expert cannot be allowed to give his opinion based
upon statements made to him by parties out of court and not under oath.
His opinion to be admissible must be founded either on his own personal
knowledge of the facts, upon facts testified to in court, or else upon
an hypothetical question. Hence the opinion of a physician, called in
consultation with the attending physicians, cannot be received if based
upon declarations made to him by such physicians, or by the wife and
nurse of the patient as to his previous symptoms or condition. It has
never been held that a medical expert has the right to give in evidence
an opinion based on information which he has derived from private
conversations with third parties.l"
Thus, consulting physicians had to be called as witnesses to testify about
their own personal knowledge or opinions.
Sixty years later McCormick argued that experts should be given
wider latitude to testify to opinions based on inadmissible hearsay,
especially "highly reliable" out-of-court statements that experts often
used in their own practice. 49 Examples included "a report of an exami-
nation by another physician, or hospital charts and records showing the
symptoms, treatment and progress of a patient."'' 0 McCormick ac-
knowledged that the common law permitted only experts with "firsthand
knowledge" to "give his inferences or opinions positively and directly,
147. JAMEs H. CASSEDY, MEDICNE IN AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY 93-94 (1991).
148. ROGERS, supra note 17, § 46. Wigmore was a bit more tentative. He concurred that
aside from professional texts and patient's statements, medical experts could not predicate opinions
on "hearsay information." Wigmore noted, however, that "where the person is a nurse or other
attendant, it would seem that the same necessity and propriety here demanded its admission."
The necessity and propriety apparently referred to the physician's use of the patient's statements
in offering treatment. 1 GREEBLJEAF ON EVMENCE, supra note 63, § 430(L), at 529-30.
149. McCORMICK I, supra note 31, § 15, at 32.
150. Id.
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rather than in the muffled, abstract form of an answer based on a
hypothesis."' He further conceded that "statements made by third
persons" did not qualify as firsthand knowledge." 2 Under the prevailing
view, then, experts' opinions could be based on such third-party reports
only where the proponent specified them as assumed factual predicates
in a hypothetical, which also meant that the predicate had to be proven
by admissible evidence. ' 3 Moreover, the prevailing view appeared
to control even where the third-party report "supplemented" the expert's
personal observations.154
Rankled by the prevailing view, McCormick advocated a contrary
view found in several cases.15s Experts in "science" were presumed
"competent to judge.., the reliability of statements made to him by
other investigators or technicians. ' ' 56 He then offered the following
proposal:
If the statements, then, are attested by the expert as the basis for a
judgment upon which he would act in the practice of his profession,
it seems that they should ordinarily be a sufficient basis even standing
alone for his direct expression of professional opinion on the stand,
and this argument is reinforced when the opinion is founded not only
upon such reports but also in part upon the expert's firsthand observation.
The data of observation will usually enable the expert to evaluate the
reliability of the statement."
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. McCormick explained that the prevailing view did not permit lawyers to skirt
the issue by ignoring the hearsay problem and allowing the expert to testify to an opinion as
if the third-party report was part of his firsthand knowledge:
The essential objection seems to be that since the question is not hypothetical in form,
the jury is asked to accept as evidence the witness' inference, based upon some one
[sic] else's hearsay assertion of a fact which is, presumably, not supported by any
evidence at the trial and which therefore the jury has no basis for finding to be true.
Id.
154. McCoRMICK I, supra note 31, § 15, at 32-33.
155. Id.
156. Id. § 15, at 33. Professor McCormick argued that experts were as competent to determine
the reliability of third-party reports as the judge and jury were to evaluate the credibility of
lay witnesses on the stand.
157. Id.
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McCormick's principal authority was Sundquist v. Madison Rys.
Co.,'m a lawsuit that arose when a streetcar rear-ended plaintiff's
automobile in Madison, Wisconsin.'5 9 Although not physically injured,
the plaintiff claimed that she had developed a nervous disorder." 0
Over two months after the Wisconsin crash, the plaintiff fainted after
hearing a clanging streetcar bell in Olympia, Washington." The very
next evening she experienced paralysis." 2 The plaintiff's suit claimed
that the earlier car crash caused her paralysis. 63
In her case-in-chief, the plaintiff presented evidence from two doctors:
the one who treated her in Wisconsin following the streetcar crash and
a second doctor who attended to her paralysis in Washington.1" Both
diagnosed the patient as suffering from "hysterical paralysis."'" The
Washington doctor did not appear at trial; rather, the plaintiff was
permitted to read his deposition to the jury.'" The defendant called
doctors who disputed the causal connection, but the defendant's doctors
158. 197 Wis. 83, 221 N.W. 392 (1928).
159. Sundquist, 221 N.W. at 392; see MCCORMICK I, supra note 31, § 15, at 33 nn.3-4.
In a footnote McCormick also cited Schooler v. State, 175 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. Ct. App. 1943),
for which he offered the following digest: "geologist testifies to opinion as to prospects for
oil in a certain region, based on his own inspection and upon geological reports." MCCoRMICK
I, supra note 31, § 15, at 33 n.3. Schooler was a condemnation proceeding in which a geologist
testified about the geological features of the area, concluding that there was a low likelihood
for oil or gas there. Although the geologist had some firsthand knowledge of the area, he admitted
"that his testimony was based 'in large part on geological reports made by others."' Relying
on Sundquist v. Madison Rys. Co., the court held that the geologist's testimony was admissible:
The conclusions of an expert as to so technical a subject as the geological features
of a defined area arrived at in part from study of unsworn reports prepared by other
experts are analogous to the diagnosis by a physician based in part on unsworn reports
of tests made by hospital technicians.
Schooler, 175 S.W.2d at 670.
160. Sundquist, 221 N.W. at 392.




165. Sundquist, 221 N.W. at 393. The court reviewed the doctors' testimony in the context
of reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence.
166. 197 BIumFs & CASES: WISCONSIN 83; Sundquist v. Madison Rys. Co., No. 47, Record
at 141 [hereinafter Sundquist Record].
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had not "seen or treated" the plaintiff.16 7 The defendant argued that
the Washington doctor's deposition
was not admissible because the doctor testified that he made his diagnosis
of hysterical paralysis by the exclusion of other possible causes for
plaintiffs condition, and that in so doing he relied upon the report of
the result of examinations made by hospital technicians, such as are
regularly made in modem hospitals, as well as upon the history of the
case and what he found upon his examination of the plaintiff.'"
In short, the doctor's basis apparently consisted of the patient's statements
(the history), his firsthand observations of her condition, and the reports
prepared by hospital technicians. The defendant attacked the doctor's
reliance on the reports because the technicians had not testified about
"how the tests were made or that the result[s] of these tests were correctly
recorded in these reports."'16 9 Nevertheless, the trial court admitted
the deposition, and the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff.70
The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the admissibility of the doctor's
testimony.' The court framed the issue with a rhetorical flourish
that foreshadowed its holding: could a judge bar a doctor from testifying
to a diagnosis where the physician "has actually used the result of those
tests in a diagnosis and in the treatment of the plaintiff."'172 The Wis-
consin court declined to
shut its eyes to a source of information which is relied on by mankind
generally in matters that involve the health and may involve the life
of their families and of themselves-a source of information that is
essential that the court should possess in order that it may do justice
between these parties litigant. 73
Although the court declined to shut its eyes, it also observed that the
jury had not been allowed to hear anything about reports because their
"contents" had not been "disclosed."'74 In closing, the court concluded:
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In making a diagnosis for treatment, physicians must of necessity consider
many things that do not appear in sworn proof on the trial of a lawsuit,-
things that mean much to the trained eye and touch of a skilled medical
practitioner. This court has held that it will not close the doors of the
courts to the light which is given by a diagnosis which all the rest of
the world accepts and acts upon, even if the diagnosis is in part based
upon facts which are not established by the sworn testimony in the case
to be true.Y75
Before returning to McCormick's Sundquist-inspired rule, several
points about the case need to be emphasized. First, Sundquist concerned
only the admissibility of the doctor's diagnosis. Neither party placed
the underlying reports into evidence nor were the contents disclosed
to the jury.176 Thus, Sundquist is silent about the proponent's latitude
to have the expert explain how he reached his conclusion, especially
where some of the bases are inadmissible.'" Second, it would have
been grossly impractical to have the technicians appear to testify. The
trial was held in Dane County, Wisconsin, in the 1920's.178 The doctor
treated the plaintiff in a hospital near Olympia, Washington. 79 In
a world blessedly ignorant of overnight delivery, fax machines, and
red-eye flights, it was impractical to continue the trial so that the plaintiff
could call the technicians to the stand or obtain the original reports,
X-rays, etc. Finally, the doctor in Washington not only examined the
plaintiff, but he also treated her based on his diagnosis.'8s According
to the court's language in Sundquist, the physician "actually used the
result of those tests."'1' Thus, the doctor was not intoning that he
regularly relied upon this type of data in rendering diagnoses; rather,
he had actually treated the plaintiff long before the inception of the
litigation against the streetcar company.
175. Id.
176. Id. The court did not explain what it meant by "contents" or "disclosed to the jury."
Thus, it is not clear whether the jury heard absolutely nothing about the reports, or whether
the jury was told only that the doctor had relied on certain technical reports but nothing about
the specific details of their contents.
177. Sundquist, 221 N.W. at 393.
178. Id.
179. My assumption is that the doctor from Washington treated her in a hospital near Olympia.
See Sundquist Record, supra note 166, at 140.
180. Sundquist Record, supra note 166, at 140.
181. Id.
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With this understanding of the Sundquist case, one can more easily
appreciate McCormick's proposed rule. First, the proposal did not extend
to experts in all fields but was deliberately confined to an "expert in
science.' '18 2 Moreover, all the case law cited as supporting the rule
involved medical experts (with one exception).l' Second, McCormick
said almost nothing about disclosure.' 4 That is, he did not specify
whether the expert could detail the third-party report during the direct
examination for the limited purpose of explaining how he reached his
conclusion.'8 Rather, McCormick focused on the admissibility of
the expert's opinion.' 8l The most that he said about disclosure was
that the expert would have to "attest" that the hearsay statement was
"the basis for a judgment upon which he would act in the practice of
his profession."'8 7 Third, McCormick limited the class of hearsay
declarants to "investigators or technicians," which fell far-short of
embracing all species of hearsay relied by expert witnesses.' s
Rheingold's 1962 article outlining expert validation tracked McCor-
mick's analysis but with several important differences.' 89 Rheingold
confined himself exclusively to medical experts, but his analysis went
beyond McCormick's cryptic concern with statements made by other
"investigators or technicians."" The cases fell into three categories.
First, Rheingold looked at statements made by other doctors, nurses,
or technicians. 19' Although doctors commonly relied upon such hearsay
in forming their opinions, "[t]he weight of the cases appears to deny
the use of information gained from medical personnel.""92 Auspiciously,
182. MCCORMICK I, supra note 31, § 15, at 33.
183. Id. § 15, at 32-33 nn.1-4; see supra note 159 (discussing Schooler, which involved
a geologist). All other cases noted involved physicians or psychiatrists.





189. Rheingold, supra note 98, at 505.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. Cited are cases involving "statements by fellow doctors, including attending doctors,
consulting doctors, medical examiners, hospital superintendents, and others; statements by nurses;
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however, Rheingold detected an emerging "trend toward medical reality"
that permitted doctors to rely on such hearsay when testifying to their
own opinions.9 3 Both the medical need for the information and the
"assumed reliability of medical personnel generally" outweighed the
slight danger that the jury might hear erroneous information."4
The second area involved the results of medical tests performed or
interpreted by others.'" Most cases precluded the expert's reliance
on such hearsay as a proper basis for an opinion, but Rheingold caustically
dismissed them as "encrusted" relics "of an old vintage."'' In their
stead, he enthusiastically offered Sundquist v. Madison Rys. Co., 97
decided forty years earlier, as the leading example of a "strong minority
of well-reasoned, scientifically accurate cases."''
The third source of hearsay involved "medical forms" or other "hospital
records."' 99 Again the cases were in gross disarray over the substantive
admissibility of such records and the propriety of a doctor's reliance
on such information while testifying. ° Summarizing the more recent
cases, Rheingold concluded "that much secondhand medical information-
drug sheets, diet notes, pulse and temperature charts and the like-is
being relied upon in the course of medical testimony and is being
sanctioned either through general admission of the document or through
established propriety of the subsidiary information relied upon."'
statements by staffs at mental hospitals; and statements embodied in hospital records and in
certificates of various sorts." Id. (footnotes omitted).
193. Id. at 506. Rheingold also observed that Wigrore had first detected this trend around
1940. Id. (citing 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EvIDENcE § 688, at 8).
194. Rheingold, supra note 98, at 508.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 509.
197. 197 Wis. 83, 221 N.W. 392 (1928).
198. Rheingold, supra note 98, at 509. Rheingold also criticized aberrant cases that had
confused the expert's reliance on the basis with its substantive use as evidence (which was
improper absent a hearsay exception) as well as cases that required a production of "the tangible
results of the test-graphs, plates or the like." Id. at 511. Citing the opportunities to inspect
such materials through pretrial discovery, Rheingold opposed production of the tangible results
unless they were "readily producible." Id.
199. Id. at 512.
200. Id. at 514.
201. Id.
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To bring order to such disparate bodies of case law, Rheingold
recommended the principle of expert validation. 2°2 Courtroom practice
should be harmonized with medical practice. Doctors should be permitted
to testify to opinions based on the same kind of information they rely
upon in their clinics or surgical theaters. Expert validation, then,
represents a better overall approach that can be applied to any bases
relied upon by a medical expert rather than the exasperatingly arbitrary
distinctions that mark the chaotic case law.
III. Experts and the Federal Rules of Evidence
A. Introduction
The Advisory Committee that drafted the Federal Rules of Evidence
labored from 1961 until the rules were enacted in the mid-1970s.
2 3
Article VII consisted of six rules governing expert and opinion testimony.
Although Congress substantially altered a number of rules during its
review of the Advisory Committee's draft, it did not alter any part of
Article VII.2"
What impact, then, did the federal rules have on the common law
of expert evidence? Or, to ask a slightly different question, why should
we care about the common-law rules in light of Article VII? In one
sense the federal rules offer a beguiling simplicity. Four short rules-
Rules 702 through 705-appear to govern the complexities of expert
evidence. The temptation is to dismiss the entire common-law backdrop
or relegate it to a footnote that explains why the Advisory Committee
made the decisions it did.
But this would be a mistake. Although the federal rules undoubtedly
changed a number of important common-law rules,2 they did not
202. Id. at 531-34. Rheingold's views on expert validation are set forth in more detail
in the text accompanying notes 88-96.
203. See 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 5006.
204. In the wake of the John Hinckley insanity trial, Congress created Federal Rule of Evidence
704(b) in 1984. See H.R. REP. 1030, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 230, reprinted in 2 McCoRMICK
II, supra note 60, app. A, at 649. Rule 704(b) represents the only substantive change to Article
VII since its approval by the Advisory Committee.
205. For example, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct.
2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993) clarified that Rule 702 did away with the common law's Frye
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supersede them in all respects. Nor did the text of the rules explicitly
address all of the problems posed by the common-law rules. " Shortly
after the federal rules became effective, Professor James McElhaney
thoughtfully summarized the relationship between Article VII and the
common-law rules: "While organized in a system that superficially
suggests they stand alone, the rules are actually a set of additions and
modifications to the common law, and only make sense in that con-
text."2" In short, Article VII, along with several critical hearsay excep-
tions,0 certainly altered the common-law foundation, but the drafters
left a significant part of it intact. Moreover, the adjustments had
unintended and unforeseen consequences. The Advisory Committee's
alchemy produced a strange brew, especially Rule 702's warm embrace
of expert assistance whenever helpful, Rule 703's acceptance of expert
opinions based even on inadmissible case-specific evidence, and Rule
705's laissez-faire approach to disclosure.
The purpose of this section is to explain how Rules 702 through 705
affected the common law.2" Primary reliance is placed on the rules'
text as well as the corresponding Advisory Committee's notes.210
Part ffl.C. will discuss some of the more salient problems that have
arisen because of the drafters' alchemy, particularly those involving
Rule 703, and how the courts and rule-making authorities have responded
to these issues.
B. The Major Premises:
Rule 702 and Rules 803(17) and 803(18)
Rule 702 governs when expert evidence may be admitted and the
qualifications for expert witnesses. The rule states: "If scientific,
test, which limited scientific evidence to those techniques or theories that were generally accepted
by the scientific community. See Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 356.
206. See James McElhaney, Expert Witnesses and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 28 MERCER
L. REV. 463 (1977).
207. Id.
208. See infra text accompanying notes 220-36, 251-68.
209. Rule 704 governs the admissibility of opinion testimony on ultimate issues in the litigation.
210. The Supreme Court has relied on the Advisory Committee's Notes on a number of
occasions. See, e.g., Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, -, 115 S. Ct. 696, 702, 130 L.
Ed. 2d 574, 584 (1995).
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technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."2
The rule departed from the common law in several dramatic ways.
First, Rule 702 replaced the common law's necessity standard with one
of "assistance" to the trier of fact, thus enabling experts to testify even
on issues with which the jury had some familiarity.2 2 No longer would
courts ration expert testimony on a "need to know" basis. Second, Rule
702's assistance standard together with Rule 402's generous approach
to relevancy sounded the death knell for the Frye standard, which
purportedly limited scientific evidence to those theories and techniques
that had gained general acceptance in the pertinent scientific communi-
ty.213
However, Rule 702 continued the common law's recognition that
expertise can arise from skill and experience (hands-on training) as well
as formal education and licensure requirements (books, lectures, and
degrees). 4 Professor Edward Imwinkelried has argued persuasively
that Rule 702 governs the expert's major premises, which are the theories
or the techniques that the expert applies to the case-specific facts (i.e.,
the minor premises).2' s With respect to scientific experts, the major
premises refer to a "validation technique, consisting in the formulation
of hypotheses, followed by observation or experimentation to test the
hypotheses. 2 1' 6 And in most instances, the expert's knowledge of
the major premises arises from hearsay sources.
211. FED. R. EvID. 702.
212. FED. R. EviD. 702 advisory committee's note. The Advisory Committee relied heavily
on Mason Ladd's observations. See supra text accompanying notes 21-22.
213. Rule 402 provides that only relevant evidence is admissible. Relevancy is defined
in Rule 401. Rule 702 mortally wounded Frye, but the victim lingered for nearly twenty years
before dying in 1994. See Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 356.
214. See FED. R. EviD. 702.
215. See Edward 1. lmwinkelried, The Educational Significance of the Syllogistic Structure
of Expert Testimony, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 1148 (1993); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The "Bases"
of Expert Testimony: The Syllogistic Structure of Scientific Testimony, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1988).
216. Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 357.
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As we have seen, the common law largely suppressed much of this
hearsay. It recognized no general "learned treatise" exception, although
some writings could be used for impeachment during cross-examina-
217Motftion. Most of the hearsay bearing on the major premise was simply
repackaged as the expert's personal knowledge and fed to the jury as
the witness's original thoughts on the subject. Thus, courts tolerated
explanations by qualified experts provided their testimony did not literally
quote from other authorities; the witness was the only salient authority.
Rule 702 is silent on the disclosure of the expert's major premises.
It provides that the expert can testify in the form of an opinion "or
otherwise," which means that the expert can offer a "dissertation or
exposition" on her area of expertise.2 s But Rule 702 says nothing
about whether the expert can explicitly refer to, or quote from, treatises,journals, lecture notes, and the like, or whether instead the expert must
present the information as part of a repertoire of personal knowledge. 21
The Advisory Committee did not ignore the problem entirely. Rule
803(17) provides a hearsay exception for published compilations, such
as market quotations, lists, or directories of various sorts.220 The
compilations may be those "generally used and relied upon" by the lay
public or experts in specific fields.22 ' In extending its reach to compila-
tions widely used by the lay public, Rule 803(17) expanded the common-
law rule, which had been narrowly geared toward experts, and demanded
a level of reliability that approached judicial notice.222
More importantly, the drafters created a hearsay exception for learned
treatises, Rule 80 3 (1 8).223 It permits the use of authoritative articles,
books, or other writings as substantive evidence.224 The Advisory
Committee recognized the trustworthiness of such writings, but expressed
217. See supra part II.D.1; see also FED. R. EVID. 803(18) advisory committee's note(observing that the "great weight of authority" excluded learned treatises as substantive evidence
but allowed their use on cross-examination).
218. FED. R. EvID. 702 advisory committee's note.
219. Id.
220. FED. R. EVID. 803(17).
221. Id.
222. See FED. R. EViD. 803(17) advisory committee's note.
223. FED. R. EvlD. 803(18).
224. Id.
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concern that sophisticated, technical material might be misapplied or
misunderstood by lay persons.2 s
The rule's mechanics reflect the drafters' balance of specialized
trustworthiness with lay comprehension. First, the proponent must show
that the writing is a "reliable authority" either through testimony or
judicial notice.m Thus, a qualified expert can lay a sufficient predicate
by acknowledging the writing's reliability during direct examination.
22 7
Moreover, a cross-examiner can confront opposing experts with such
writings regardless of whether they have relied upon the writings or
recognize their reliability.2  Second, to minimize the danger that
a lay jury might misunderstand or misuse the treatise, Rule 803(18)
requires an expert chaperon.229 The writing's content must be brought
to the jury's attention through an intermediary, the expert witness, whether
on direct or cross-examination. -
The expert chaperonage requirement attests to the Advisory Commit-
tee's concerns about disclosure. Rule 803(18) forces lawyers to strain
the writing's contents through the filter of expert testimony.231 The
225. FED. R. EvID. 803(18) advisory committee's note.
226. FED. R. EvID. 803(18). The authority's reliability presents a preliminary question
of admissibility for the trial judge under Rule 104(a). The judge must be convinced of the
writing's reliability by a preponderance of the evidence, but is not bound by the rules of evidence
(except with respect to privileges) in so deciding.
227. FED. R. EvID. 803(18) advisory committee's notes.
228. See id. The Advisory Committee stated:
The relevance of the use of treatises on cross-examination is evident. This use of
treatises has been the subject of varied views. The most restrictive position is that
the witness must have stated expressly on direct his reliance upon the treatise. A slightly
more liberal approach still insists upon reliance but allows it to be developed on cross-
examination. Further relaxation dispenses with reliance but requires recognition as
an authority by the witness, developable on cross-examination. The greatest liberality
is found in decisions allowing use of the treatise on cross-examination when its status
as an authority is established by any means.
Id. Rule 803(18) explicitly distinguishes between direct and cross-examination: on direct
examination the expert must have "relied" on the writing, but the cross-examiner need only
bring the writing "to the attention of an expert witness." FED. R. EviD. 803(18).
229. See FED. R. EVID. 803(18) advisory committee's notes.
230. Some state variants of federal Rule 803(18) do not require expert chaperonage. See,
e.g., WIs. STAT. ANN. § 908.03(18) (West 1993). For a full explanation of this statute, see
7 DANIEL D. BLINKA, WISCONSIN PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 803.18 (1991).
231. See FED. R. EvID. 803(18).
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rule expressly forbids receipt of the tangible writing as an exhibit. 2
The written word is not allowed primacy; everything is oral in form.
Whether the source is the expert's firsthand knowledge or the printed
word, the jury hears only the spoken word. In its tangible form, the
writing appears only in the hands of the lawyer or witness who reads
from it, or perhaps as a demonstrative exhibit. 3 The rule's mechanics
virtually assure that parties will use brief excerpts from longer writings.
Reading vast passages from a technical treatise risks stupefying the jury
(and the judge, and the court reporter, and the lawyers) or inciting mutiny.
Thus, the rule represents only a slight improvement over the common-law
practice, but at least experts can actually quote from published sources
and courts can dispense with the fictions concerning refreshed recollection
or limiting instructions.
Rule 803(18) covers a wide array of expert literature, embracing any
"published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject of history,
medicine, or other science or art."2" Concededly, the minimal reliabili-
ty requirements are normally an easy threshold to achieve, but the rule
is not coterminous with all of the hearsay that informs the expert's major
premises. Information communicated orally obviously falls outside of
the rule. Thus, what one researcher tells another, regardless of its validity
and the declarant's status, is not within the sweep of Rule 803(18). 2 s
Similarly, an expert's database or research hypotheses might be derived
from sources that do not meet Rule 803(18)'s publication requirement.2-6
In short, the learned treatise exception does not cover all sources
of the expert's major premises. Gaps remain and, by default, the
disclosure of inadmissible evidence relating to the expert's major bases
is left to the judge's discretion under Rules 702 and 705. As we will
see, Rule 705 allows the expert to testify to an opinion "and give reasons
232. Id.
233. See FAUST R. ROSSI, EXPERT WrrNSSEs ch. 6 (1991).
234. FED. R. EvID. 803(18).
235. The same probably holds for information communicated through computers. Thus,
research and ideas exchanged over the Internet might not meet the "publication" requirement
of Rule 803(18), unlike Rule 803(6) (records of regularly conducted activities) or Rule 803(8)
(public reports and records), which explicitly embrace "data compilations."
236. See Imwinkelried, supra note 2 at 374 (assigning "epidemiological research data"
to Rule 702).
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therefor,"' " but this is hardly the same as allowing the expert to deter-
mine carte blanche what the jury should be told.
C. The Minor (Case-Specific) Premises:
Rule 703, Rule 705, and Related Hearsay Exceptions
Case-specific bases pose two distinct but (by now) familiar problems.
First, what can the expert rely upon in drawing an inference or forming
an opinion? Put another way, what are the permissible bases of an
expert's opinion? Second, how much of this information should be
related to the jury-the problem of disclosure. Rule 703 serves as the
gatekeeper for determining the permissible case-specific bases for an
expert's opinion.' However, it provides only the starting point for
the analysis; other evidentiary rules, especially certain hearsay exceptions,
are directly implicated by Rule 703. 39 Moreover, disclosure is ad-
dressed, albeit imperfectly, in Rule 705.20 We will first address the
extent of permissible bases under Rule 703 before turning to the analyti-
cally distinct problem of disclosure under Rule 705.
With beguiling clarity, Rule 703 states:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an
opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the
expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon
by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon
the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.241
The Advisory Committee explained the rule's seemingly straightforward
approach to expert bases. An expert opinion can be predicated upon
any of three possible sources. 42 The first source consisted of the
237. FED. R. EviD. 705.
238. See Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 376. Professor Imwinkelried's analysis is persuasive.
In light of these articles, it is no longer productive to argue that Rule 703 has any direct application
to the expert's major premises.
239. See FED. R. EVID. 803.
240. See FED. R. EVID. 705. Federal Rule 705 is helpfully entitled, "Disclosure of Facts
or Data Underlying Expert Opinion."
241. FED. R. EvD. 703.
242. FED. R. EviD. 703 advisory committee's note.
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expert's firsthand observations, such as a personal examination by the
treating physician.2A The second source, also derived from common-
law practice, involved the expert who learned of the facts from a
"presentation at the trial." The presentation could come from "the
familiar hypothetical question" or by listening to other witness's testimo-
ny. The innovative third source represented a negation of the first
two:
The third source contemplated by the rule consists of presentation of
data to the expert outside of court and other than by his own perception.
In this respect the rule is designed to broaden the basis for expert opinions
beyond that current in many jurisdictions and to bring the judicial practice
into line with the practice of the experts themselves when not in
court.'
Thus, there is a tidy correspondence between the three sources described
by the Advisory Committee and the first sentence of Rule 703. The
expert's bases may be those "perceived by" the expert (source #1), those
"made known to the expert" at the trial (source #2), or those "made
known to the expert" before the trial (source #3). 7
However, lurking beneath the surface of the rule are troublesome
conflicts waiting to arise. For example, where does hearsay fit into
the scheme? A quick glance at the rule suggests that hearsay is confined
to source #3, but even a moment's reflection reveals that out-of-court
statements arise in the other two sources as well. For example, a patient




246. Id. The Advisory Committee's explanation continued.
Thus a physician in his own practice bases his diagnosis on information from numerous
sources and of considerable variety, including statements by patients and relatives,
reports and opinions from nurses, technicians and other doctors, hospital records, and
X-rays. Most of them are admissible in evidence, but only with the expenditure of
substantial time in producing and examining various authenticating witnesses. The
physician makes life-and-death decisions in reliance upon them. His validation, expertly
performed and subject to cross-examination, ought to suffice for judicial purposes.
Id. (emphasis added).
247. FED. R. EvID. 703 (emphasis added).
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tion" (source #1) or the lawyer posing a hypothetical question might
ask the expert to assume the truth of hearsay contained in reports or
the testimony of other witnesses (source #2). Thus, hearsay is not
necessarily confined to the third source, but rather cuts across all three
sources. Nor is the third source limited to hearsay statements, even
though hearsay will inevitably comprise its greatest bulk.249
In short, the Advisory Committee's seemingly straightforward
description of the three sources masks Rule 703's complexity and its
interaction with other evidentiary rules. More precisely, Rule 703 is
calibrated along two different evidentiary axes which are reflected in
the rule's two terse sentences. Although the first sentence addresses
the source and timing of the expert's knowledge, the second sentence
goes more to the heart of the whole problem; namely, the evidentiary
status of the bases as "admissible" or "inadmissible" under the federal
rules.
2 s0
Cryptically encoded in Rule 703 is the simple truth that experts can
base opinions on admissible as well as inadmissible evidence. Strangely,
the rule refers to admissible evidence only in the negative, declaring
that the underlying facts or data "need not be admissible in evidence,"
provided they are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
field.2s
The expert's reliance on admissible evidence is significant not only
because it continued the common-law practice, but also because the
Federal Rules of Evidence greatly expanded the boundaries of admissibili-
ty, especially through the creation of various hearsay exceptions. As
we have already seen, Rule 803(18) (learned treatises) and Rule 803(17)
(market reports, etc.) allowed for wider admissibility of the expert's
248. The text of Rule 703 describes the first source as those facts or data "perceived by"
the expert, which the Advisory Committee equated with "firsthand observation." FED. R. EviD.
703 advisory committee's note. Thus, the Committee apparently tracked the common-law
approach to firsthand knowledge that normally excluded hearsay (e.g., statements by the patient
to the treating physician).
249. In particular, the Advisory Committee uses the example of a physician's reliance on
X-rays as well as "statements" by patients, relatives, etc. Interestingly, the Advisory Committee
did not explain why X-rays are not among source #1--the things "perceived by" the expert.
See FED. R. EvID. 703 advisory committee's note.
250. FED. R. EviD. 703.
251. Id.
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major premises in hearsay form. s2 But, a number of other exceptions
addressed case-specific hearsay as well.
For example, Rule 803(6) substantially reformed the common law's
crabbed treatment of "business records."2 3 Rule 803(6) broadly extends
to the records of any "regularly conducted business activity," ranging
from handwritten memoranda to computer files.254  Moreover, the
rule embraces a broad array of information, from factual observations
("acts," "events," or "conditions") to the "opinions or diagnoses" of
other declarants within the entity that produces the records. 25  By
including opinions and diagnoses, the drafters deliberately rejected prior
case law that had refused to admit diagnostic entries." Thus, Rule
803(6) allows the factf'mder to see the record and rely on the statements
within it for the truth of the matter asserted.
Rule 803(4) dealt in a similarly generots fashion with a patient's
statements.2 7 It provides: "Statements made for purposes of medical
diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present
symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character
of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent
to diagnosis or treatment."" Rule 803(4) eradicated the discredited
distinction between treating physicians and experts consulted solely for
the purposes of testifying at trial. Statements made to a physician for
252. See FED. R. Evm. 803.
253. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6) advisory committee's note.
254. FED. R. EvID. 803(6). Rule 803(6) provides:
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events,
conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information
transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted
business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make
the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony
of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of information or the
method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness. The term
"business" as used in this paragraph includes business, institution, association, profession,
occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
Id.
255. See id.
256. FED. R. EvID. 803(6) advisory committee's note.
257. See 2 MCCORIaKut II, supra note 60, §§ 277-78.
258. FED. R. EviD. 803(4).
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either purpose are admissible for the truth of the matter asserted.2 9
Moreover, Rule 803(4) extends not only to statements of present condi-
tion, but also to those describing past conditions and medical history,
including the cause of the injury if reasonably pertinent to the diagno-
ses.2 Finally, Rule 803(4) is not limited to physicians; such statements
might be made to any health-care giver for purposes of diagnoses or
treatment." l
What justified the expansive reach of Rule 803(4)? The Advisory
Committee first pointed to the trustworthiness of such statements. Patients
seeking treatment or diagnoses possessed a "strong motivation" to be
truthful, regardless of whether they described present symptoms or their
medical history. 2 The Committee recognized, however, that such
considerations carried much less force where the statements were made
to an expert for purposes of testifying at trial.23 So what justified
Rule 803(4)'s inclusion of trial consultants? The answer was simple
but troubling: the futility of not including them. The Committee explained
that "[c]onventional doctrine" excluded trial consultants from the reach
of the common-law hearsay exception; yet "the expert was allowed to
state the basis of his opinions, including statements of this kind."
2
"
This distinction, it observed, "was one most unlikely to be made by
juries. ' 2' For this reason, the Committee rejected "the limitation. ' '2 6
Thus, Rule 803(4) is the product of two different rationales. Statements
to treating physicians are admitted because of their trustworthiness, while
those made to trial consultants are justified by the absence of viable
alternatives. Oddly, the Advisory Committee argued that Rule 803(4)'s
inclusion of trial consultants was "consistent" with Rule 703, but failed
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee's note ("Under the exception the statement
need not have been made to a physician. Statements [made] to hospital attendants, ambulance
drivers, or even members of the family might be included.").
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to explain its conclusion.z ' The only sensible interpretation is that
the Committee believed that the kinds of statements embraced by Rule
803(4) were those reasonably relied upon by trial consultants in forming
their opinions or diagnoses and which should be disclosed to the jury
for use as substantive evidence, especially since it was futile to think
that the jury would do anything else with them.26 Similar reasoning
had justified the learned treatise exception found in Rule 803(18).269
Despite the vast extension of "admissible" evidence on which experts
can predicate opinions, Rule 703 also provides that such opinions can
be based on inadmissible facts or data.27 0 Any exclusionary rule can
render the evidence "inadmissible"; Rule 703 is not confined to hear-
say.27' For example, an expert possessing firsthand knowledge of
remedial measures taken after an accident might be barred by Rule 407
from describing the measures for the jury.2 72 The same holds for an
expert who relies on character evidence as proof of propensity contrary
to Rule 404.273 Most often, however, hearsay defects render the facts
or data inadmissible.
In the spirit of Sundquist v. Madison Rys. Co.,2 74 Rule 703 recognizes
that experts working in laboratories, hospitals, and clinics do not subscribe
to courtroom evidence rules.275 Recognizing that some experts, such
as doctors, frequently made "life-and-death decisions in reliance" on
evidence which is technically inadmissible, the Advisory Committee
concluded that trial practice must be brought "into line with the practice
267. FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee's note. The Advisory Committee stated:
'"Tis position is consistent with the provision of Rule 703 that the facts on which expert testimony
is based need not be admissible in evidence if of a kind ordinarily relied upon by experts in
the field." Id.
268. See 2 MCCORMIcK II, supra note 60, § 278, at 249-52. It is not my purpose to debate
the wisdom of Rule 803(4).
269. See FED. R. EVID. 803(18) advisory committee's note; see also supra text accompanying
notes 223-30.
270. See FED. R. EviD. 703 advisory committee's note.
271. Id.
272. See FED. R. EviD. 407.
273. See infra text accompanying notes 389-407.
274. 197 Wis. 83, 221 N.W. 392 (1928); see supra text accompanying notes 158-81.
275. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee's note.
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of the experts themselves when not in court."' 76 Accordingly, an
expert's opinion can be based on inadmissible facts of data provided
they are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field in
rendering opinions or diagnoses.2' The rationale carries the crisp
assurance of common sense. What is sufficient for "life-and-death"
decisions in the hospital should suffice for the courtroom. Thus, the
expert's "validation, expertly performed and subject to cross-examination,
ought to suffice for judicial purposes. 2 78  The Advisory Committee
pointed to a "similar provision" in the California Evidence Code, 79
but also relied on Rheingold' s article, The Basis of Medical Testimony,
and Section 15 of McCormick's treatisem
This authority did not, however, support a free-wheeling construction
of Rule 703 that swept aside all parts of the common-law superstruc-
ture.21 Particularly, it retained the bias against allowing the proponent
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. (emphasis added).
279. Id. California's Evidence Code provides:
If a witness is testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of an opinion is limited
to such an opinion as is:
b. Based on matter (including his special knowledge, skill, experience, training, and
education) perceived by or personally known to the witness or made known to him
at or before the hearing, whether or not admissible, that is of a type that reasonably
may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the subject to which
his testimony relates, unless an expert is precluded by law from using such matter
as a basis for his opinion.
CAL. EvID. CODE § 801(b). California authority does not support the position that the proponent
has the right to brandish inadmissible evidence before the jury. One commentator explained:
But the fact that the opponent is entitled to a limiting instruction does not authorize
the proponent to disclose the contents of reports and other hearsay which the expert
took into account in reaching his opinion. The value of the disclosure to the expert's
credibility may be too slight when compared with the risk that the jurors might be
unable to abide by the instruction directing them not to consider the matters disclosed
for the truth of the matter stated. The risk varies with the amount of details disclosed.
MIGUEL A. MENDEz, CAUiFoRNIA EVIDENCE Wrri COMPARISON TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE 313 (1993) (footnote omitted).
280. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee's note. The Advisory Committee cited Rheingold's
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to elicit inadmissible bases during the expert's direct examination."2
Rheingold and McCormick had vigorously advocated the "expert
validation" principle, but they did so in contexts decidedly narrower
than Rule 703.283 Rheingold, it will be remembered, focused exclusively
on testimony offered by physicians, i.e., medical doctors.2 4 He did
not deal with chiropractors or dentists, much less engineers, psychologists,
or economists. McCormick's proposal was somewhat broader, but not
by much. He addressed "investigators and technicians" working in various
fields of"science." 2w But McCormick, like Rheingold, drew extensively
from appellate cases that dealt with medical doctors.2  And many
of the most irksome problems identified by both writers had already
been addressed through other evidentiary reforms, such as the exceptions
for learned treatises and statements made for purposes of medical
diagnosis or treatment (Rules 803(18) and 803(4))."s
Moreover, the Advisory Committee was as preoccupied with medical
experts as Rheingold and McCormick. Most of its examples concerned
physicians and medical-type evidence.2 Almost as an afterthought,
the Advisory Committee added that Rule 703 offered "a more satisfactory
basis for ruling upon the admissibility of public opinion poll evidence,"
a rare type of proof confined largely to certain kinds of commercial
cases.
289
In sum, despite Rule 703's breadth, expert validation rested primarily
upon the legal profession's growing confidence in, and acquaintance
with, one particular kind of expert witness-the medical doctor. More
troubling, even the examples involving medical evidence involved
information that (most often) would be fully admissible, except for "the
expenditure of substantial time in producing and examining various
authenticating witnesses.
282. Id.
283. See McCoRMIcK I supra note 31; see also Rheingold, supra note 98.
284. Rheingold, supra note 98.
285. McCoRMICK I, supra note 31, § 15; see also supra note 134.
286. Id.
287. See supra text accompanying notes 223-36, 257-69.
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The Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 703, then, raises a host of
puzzling questions. Did the legal system's experience with medical
experts justify a general principle of expert validation? Did other rules
eliminate the most glaring common-law problems, thus obviating the
need for Rule 703? In particular, was expert validation defensible in
light of the learned treatise exception (Rule 803(18)), which applies
to expert treatises in all fields, or the exception for statements made
for purposes of medical diagnosis (Rule 803(4)), which together addressed
two of the most pressing common-law problems? And finally, had the
Advisory Committee adequately considered the potentially lethal mix
of Rule 703 with Rule 702's beckoning of experts in all stripes, shapes,
and colors? Under the new rules the stream of experts coming into
the courtroom would soon become a torrent, and it was no longer clear
what a judge could do to prevent the flood.
Rule 703's scheme of expert validation did not, at least arguably,
surrender all discretion to the expert witness. The inadmissible basis
had to be of a type that was reasonably relied upon.291 To illustrate
the rule's application, and perhaps to suppress doubts that it offered
no weapon against abuses, the Advisory Committee offered this example:
"The [reasonable reliance] language would not warrant admitting in
evidence the opinion of an 'accidentologist' as to the point of impact
in an automobile collision based on statements of bystanders since this
requirement is not satisfied., 292 But how would a judge know when
other experts had stepped beyond the bounds of reasonable reliance? 293
In particular, what should a judge do when confronted by unrefuted
expert testimony that the facts or data are of a type reasonably relied
upon? 294  Or, equally troubling, what happens when experts from
opposing sides differ over whether their "field" reasonably relies upon
the type of fact or data at issue? As the next section will reveal, both




293. The Advisory Committee did not explain how it reached this conclusion; rather, it
tersely cited Comment, Cal. L. Rev. Comm'n, Recommendation Proposing an Evidence Code
148-50 (1965).
294. See In re Swine Flu Immunization Prod. Liab. Litig., 508 F. Supp. 897, 903 (D. Colo.
1981), aff'd sub nom. Lima v. United States, 708 F.2d 502 (10th Cir. 1983).
295. See Imwinkelried, supra note 2.
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The Advisory Committee's "accidentologist" or bystander statement
example raises another interesting point. Not only did the Committee
conclude that the bystander's statement could not be reasonably relied
upon, but the flaw rendered inadmissible the expert's opinion as to the
point of impact.29 ' Thus, an infected basis mortally wounds the opinion
it supports. Neither the bad basis nor tainted opinion can be put before
the jury.297
But what about an inadmissible basis that was reasonably relied upon?
Rule 703 explicitly admitted opinions drawn from inadmissible bases, 2 "
but could the bases be disclosed to the jury for any purpose? Rheingold's
conception of expert validation, limited as it was to medical experts,
virtually equated reasonable reliance and disclosure; that is, the expert's
reasonable reliance caried sufficient assurances that justified disclosure,
especially because juries could not properly evaluate the opinion without
knowing about how it was reached.2 99 Rule 703's text is silent on
the question of disclosure; rather, the drafters apparently attempted to
address all issues of disclosure in Rule 705. 00
Rule 705 is broadly entitled, Disclosure of Facts or Data Underlying
Expert Opinion, but the rule is neither limited to "facts or data" nor
particularly clear on when or how they should be disclosed. The rule
states: "The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and
give reasons therefor without first testifying to the underlying facts or
data, unless the court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event
be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examina-
tion.'31 Thus, the rule's taxonomy distills expert testimony into three
296. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee's note.
297. Id. Although the Advisory Committee did not elaborate upon its example, it seems
to follow that the opinion should be struck only where the impermissible (and inadmissible)
bases is critical to the opinion.
298. Id.
299. Rheingold, supra note 98, at 478; see also supra text accompanying notes 116-30
(explaining Rheingold's approach). Rheingold emphasized that disclosure was necessary for
the jury's proper evaluation of the opinion, but cautioned that "proper instructions" were needed.
Rheingold, supra note 98, at 478. He did not address the content of such-instructions. McCormick
was also silent on the disclosure issue. See MCCORMICK I, supra note 31, § 15.
300. Although Rule 703's text is silent on disclosure, its accompanying Advisory Committee's
Note reveals a great deal about how the drafters saw the interrelationship of Rule 703 and Rule
705. See FED. R. EvD. 703 advisory committee's note.
301. FED. R. EviD. 705.
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forms: (1) opinions and inferences;3M2 (2) the "reasons therefor";m3
and (3) the underlying "facts or data."3 4
Despite its apparent detail, Rule 705 fails to offer a comprehensive
framework governing the timing or the manner in which the three forms
are disclosed to the jury. Like overhearing only part of a conversation,
the mandates in Rule 705 make little sense unless placed in context.
Rule 705 represents part of a dialogue between the federal architects
and the common-law disclosure rules; specifically, the drafters addressed
the common-law rules governing hypotheticals and the expert's personal
knowledge.
The first sentence of Rule 705 allows experts to testify to opinions
and inferences, along with "reasons therefor," regardless of whether
the expert has first testified to the "underlying facts or data" and subject
to the trial judge's discretion to require "otherwise. ' '-0 The second
sentence clarifies that, "in any event," the expert may be required to
disclose the underlying facts or data during cross-examination. 3IN
The phrase "in any event" most likely means that the cross-examiner
is entitled to delve into the underlying bases regardless of whether the
direct examiner has elicited such testimony from the expert.
Rule 705, then, worked two changes. First, experts with personal
knowledge were freed from having to recount in tortuous detail all of
the underlying bases before offering their opinion. Second, Rule 705
eliminated the requirement of a hypothetical question where the expert
lacked personal knowledge.
To justify the rule, the Advisory Committee summed up decades
of withering criticism that had been directed at the hypothetical question
requirement.307 Often tortured, time-consuming exercises, hypothetical
questions encouraged "partisan bias" by lawyers who capitalized on
the requirement in order to "sum up" during the evidentiary stage of
302. Id.
303. Neither the rule nor the Advisory Committee defined "reasons" in a way that distinguishes
them from opinions, inferences, or the underlying facts or data. See Imwinkelried, supra note
2, at 369.
304. FED. R. EviD. 705.
305. See id.
306. See id.
307. See FED. R. EvID. 705 advisory committee's note.
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the trial." The drafters also pointed to similar rules relaxing hypotheti-
cal requirements in New York and other states.3' The Committee's
note further explained:
While the rule allows counsel to make disclosure of the underlying facts
or data as a preliminary to the giving of an expert opinion, ifhe chooses,
the instances in which he is required to do so are reduced. This is
true whether the expert bases his opinion on data furnished him at
secondhand or observed by him at firsthand.310
The Committee did not define the terms "firsthand" and "secondhand,"
but one could argue that such definitions were superfluous because the
rule purportedly eliminated the need for such a distinction. However,
it is not possible to write-off the distinction in light of the Advisory
Committees' remarks about how Rule 705 affected the disclosure of
the three sources of expert opinion permitted by Rule 703: facts or data
personally observed by the expert (source #1); facts or data made known
to the expert at the hearing (source #2); and, facts or data made known
to the expert "outside of court and other than by his own perception"
(source #3).311
As we have seen, Rule 703 continued the common-law practice of
permitting experts to base opinions on their own personal knowledge
(source #1), but the common law had also required that the experts recite
their firsthand observations before testifying to their opinion.S The
Note to Rule 703 cryptically announced the elimination of the prior
disclosure rule: "Whether he must first relate his observations is treated
in Rule 705."' 3
Addressing source #2, the Committee observed that facts or data
may be supplied to experts at the trial through hypothetical assumptions
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id. (emphasis added). Interestingly, the Committee's phrase "if he chooses" seems
to leave the choice of prior disclosure to the expert or, more accurately, the party calling the
expert. The text of Rule 705 clarifies, however, that the trial judge has the discretion to order
"otherwise."
311. See FED. R. EviD. 703 advisory committee's note.
312. See supra text accompanying notes 87-90. This device ensured that the expert's opinion
was based on admissible evidence.
313. FED. R. EviD. 703 advisory committee's note.
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or by having experts listen to the testimony of other witnesses-again,
both venerable common-law practices. 314 Often, however, witnesses
presented conflicting testimony. Thus, where experts acquired their
facts or data by listening to conflicting witnesses at trial, the common
law had also required hypothetical questions to identify on which version
of events the expert relied.31s Again, the Committee cryptically an-
nounced the death of this requirement: "Problems of determining what
testimony the expert relied upon ... may be resolved by resort to Rule
705.'316
And how did Rule 705 affect source #3; namely, the "presentation
of data to the expert outside of court and other than by his own percep-
tion"? 317 The Advisory Committee did not explicitly address the issue,
not even with another cryptic reference to Rule 705. Nor did Rule 705
or its accompanying note shed much light on the disclosure of source
#3. True, the Committee eschewed any distinction between firsthand
and secondhand knowledge, but this did not resolve very much. 31 8
"Firsthand" pretty clearly refers to the expert's personal knowledge,
but "secondhand" is perplexingly ambiguous.31 Although broad enough
to cover the hearsay typically bound up with source #3, secondhand
evidence could also be read narrowly to embrace just source #2: the
hypothetical assumptions fed to experts by lawyers, or experts who learned
what occurred by listening to witnesses testify. In short, neither the
text of Rules 703 and 705 nor their Advisory Committee's Notes provide
much guidance on the disclosure, during direct examination, of inadmissi-
ble bases presented to the expert "outside of court."32
However, there is no reason to believe that the Advisory Committee
ignored the problem; rather, one should assume that the committee
intended that the common-law practice precluding such disclosures during
direct examination would continue. The Committee's immediate concern
314. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 91-93.
315. See supra text accompanying note 94.
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was to justify changes in the common law, not to elaborate upon
commonly accepted practices. In particular, the Advisory Committee
defended Rule 705 against the charge that it was "essentially unfair"
to saddle the cross-examiner with the burden "to bring out the supporting
data." 3 The "answer" was straightforward: the cross-examiner "is
under no compulsion to bring out any facts or data except those unfavor-
able to the opinion." 322 Moreover, the cross-examiner would gain
"advance knowledge" of these bases through the discovery rules, a
function that the "traditional foundation requirement" had performed
"imperfectly." 323
Thus, Rule 705 primarily addressed outmoded rules that required
experts to disgorge the underlying bases before testifying to the opinion
itself.3u Under the earlier common law, this made sense because
the opinion had to be predicated on admissible evidence, but the rule
had become mired in sterile technicalities that rendered expert testimony
tedious, dry, and uninformative. Put another way, the Advisory Commit-
tee focused on the expert's reliance on admissible evidence and the
common law's compulsory disclosure rules as the primary problem.32'
The Committee paid less attention to the converse problem: the direct
examiner's disclosure of the inadmissible bases that were "favorable"
to the expert's opinion as now permitted by Rule 703.326 One could
argue that the Committee assumed that disclosure during direct examina-
tion was adequately safeguarded by the combination of expert validation
and limiting instructions. But this reading is difficult to reconcile with
the Committee's disparaging comments about such limiting instructions
in other contexts. The federal rules created hearsay exceptions for learned
treatises 327 and statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis
or treatment' 28 in large part because limiting instructions were wholly
321. FED. R. EvID. 705 advisory committee's note.
322. Id. The remainder of the Note discusses the need for adequate discovery rules so




326. FED. R. EVID. 705 advisory committee's note.
327. FED. R. EvID. 803(18).
328. FED. R. EviD. 803(4).
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inadequate. 329 Indeed, the Committee justified the extension of Rule
803(4) to non-treating physicians precisely because it believed in expert
validation, but was also convinced that limiting instructions were useless.
As the Committee put it, the distinction between the use of such state-
ments as "substantive evidence" or as a "basis" for the expert's opinion
"was one most unlikely to be made by juries. ' "
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the Committee did not foresee
direct examiners freely eliciting inadmissible bases. Rather, the assump-
tion was that direct examiners would not delve into the inadmissible
bases; after all, Rule 705 already allowed the direct examiner to elicit
the expert's opinions along with the "reasons therefor." 3' Such an
assumption would also explain why the Committee defended Rule 705
against charges that it unfairly burdened cross-examiners with the task
of eliciting the supporting data. Finally, this assumption comports with
the Committee's disparaging remarks about limiting instructions that
purported to distinguish between substantive use and support of the
expert's opinion.
D. Practice Under the Federal Rules
Lawyers and courts working with the federal rules have encountered
a variety of problems over the last two decades. Nothing better exempli-
fies the intractable nature of some of these issues than Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals.'2 Why did it take nearly twenty years to deter-
mine that Rule 702 jettisoned the Frye general acceptance test in favor
of a multi-factor approach linked to relevancy and helpfulness? Indeed,
Rule 702 has served as a lightening rod for courts and commentators,
attracting much more attention than Rule 703 or, certainly, Rule 705.
Moreover, authorities often failed to distinguish between Rules 702 and
7 0 3 .33 Professor Imwinkelried suggests that until Daubert there was
329. See discussion infra part III.D.1.
330. FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee's note.
331. FED. R. Evn. 705.
332. 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993).
333. See supra note 2.
334. 2 MICHAEL GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 703.1, at 99-102 (4th
ed. 1996).
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little urgency in distinguishing Rules 702 from 703 because many courts
applied a generic test (general acceptance) to both the major and minor
premises.'
Daubert "shattered" the "congruence" because it called for trial judges
to conduct searching inquiries into the reliability of the expert's techniques
and theories.336 Professor Imwinkelried has argued persuasively that
the domains of Rules 702 and 703 are clearly distinct.337  Rule 702
governs the expert's theories, methodology, and techniques in addition
to any "research data" used to support the expert's opinion.33 All
of this information shares a common point; it embodies the expertise
which is in turn applied to the case-specific facts. Rule 703, then, is
narrowly confined to the "facts or data" relating to the dispute between
the parties "in the particular case.'33
335. Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 362.
336. Id. at 363. Other commentators suggest that the congruence should be reinstated.
Professor Epps argues that the Daubert criteria should be applied to the expert's case-specific
bases under Rule 703. Epps, supra note 2, at 83.
337. Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 362-65.
338. Id. at 367-69. The term "research data" refers to data found in other studies. Courts
have split over whether research data should be scrutinized under Rule 702 or Rule 703. Daubert
seemingly resolves the split. See id. at 360.
339. FED. R. EVID. 703; see Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 372-73 (stating that "Rule 703
was never intended as the mechanism for supplying and regulating the scientific data underlying
the expert's opinion; its limited function is regulation of the input of the case-specific information
that the expert is asked to evaluate"). Professor Imwinkelried advances four arguments in support
of Rule 703's hegemony over case-specific information. First, the text of Rule 703 refers to
the facts or data "in the particular case." Inwinkelried, supra note 2, at 366. Second, this
language must be placed in the context of Rules 702 and 705. Id. at 367-68. Rule 702 does
not use the "particular case" language. d. Rule 705 carefully distinguishes among the expert's
"opinions," "reasons" for the opinion, and the "facts or data" supporting the opinion. Id. at
369. Moreover, Rule 705 obligates the direct examiner to elicit the expert's opinions and "reasons
therefor without first testifying to the underlying facts or data." Id. A "broad construction"
of "facts or data" thus would obliterate the procedural distinction between "reasons" and "facts
or data" in Rule 705. Id. Third, the Advisory Committee's note to Rule 703 also supports
the narrow interpretation. Id. at 370. And fourth, the Court's gloss in Daubert supports restricting
Rule 703 to case-specific information. Id. at 374. In conclusion, Professor Imwinkelried
explained:
Rule 702 will govern the issues of whether the witness qualifies as a scientific expert
and whether all the essential steps in the witness's scientific reasoning process have
been validated; Rule 703 will control only the question of whether there is a proper
source for the case-specific data to which the witness applies her general theory.
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Unfortunately, the conclusion that Rule 703 is restricted to case-specific
information does not make the rule any easier to understand.m The
difficulties arise, in large part, because Rule 703 has been severed from
its common-law moorings, thereby raising at least three troublesome
questions3 4" First, Rule 703 permits experts to rely on inadmissible
evidence, but how far does this extend? In particular, what is the scope
of the term "not otherwise admissible" as it relates to expert reliance?
Second, what is the judge's role in assessing the expert's reasonable
reliance? Must the judge defer to the expert's own standards or is there
an objective legal standard? Third, how much and in what form can
the inadmissible data be disclosed to the trier of fact? This last question
implicates the relationship between Rule 703 and Rule 705. These three
problems are not discrete; all are interrelated. As will be shown, the
defect that renders evidence inadmissible inevitably affects the reasonable-
ness of the expert's reliance and the issue of disclosure. But first it
is necessary to briefly consider what we mean by "admissibility."
1. The Problem of Limited Admissibility
The cases and commentary addressing Rule 703 frequently invoke
the doctrine of limited admissibility. Indeed much of the debate
340. Although this author is persuaded by Professor Imwinkelried's argument, some trial
lawyers and judges remain unconvinced, unconverted, or unaware that Daubert delineated a
distinction between the rules. There are cases involving research data where it is unclear whether
the court is applying Rule 702, Rule 703, or both. See, e.g., Finchum v. Ford Motor Co., 57
F.3d 526 (7th Cir. 1995) (applying Rule 703 to an article on passenger restraints in a products
liability case); Ventura v. Titan Sports, Inc., 65 F.3d 725, 733-34 (8th Cir. 1995) (both rules
indiscriminately applied, with no cite to Daubert, to a damages expert's reliance on a "survey
of thousands of licensing agreements").
341. In a short essay on Rule 703, Professor Imwinkelried identified five problems based
on the rule's text: (1) the demarcation between Rules 702 and 703; (2) an expert's reliance
on the opinion of another expert; (3) whether the judge must address the trustworthiness of
inadmissible facts or data, or whether it is enough to find that it is of a type relied upon by
experts in the field, (4) what is meant by "reasonable" reliance; and (5) whether and in what
form the inadmissible bases can be disclosed to the jury. Edward L Imwinkelried, Forensic
Science: Federal Rule of Evidence 703-A Minefield for the Criminal Litigator, 31 CRIM. L.
BuLL. 259, 260-67 (1995); see supra note 339 (discussing answer to the first issue). Professor
Imwinkelried's observations about the remaining issues are addressed below.
342. As will be seen, some courts and commentators contend that Rule 703 functions as
a hearsay exception, transforming otherwise inadmissible evidence into evidence that, once
validated by an expert, is admissible under Rule 703. See discussion infra part II.D.4.
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over Rule 703 is inextricably engrossed in the practice of introducing
evidence (ostensibly) for limited purposes. Although recognized at
common law, limited admissibility has become a central feature of the
federal rules.M
3
The twin cornerstones of the Federal Rules of Evidence are the related
concepts of relevancy and limited admissibility of evidence. Rule 401
defines relevant evidence: "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence." 3" Rule 402 mandates that all
relevant evidence is admissible unless otherwise provided by another
rule or statute.34s The federal rules entrust the trial judge with broad
discretion to exclude relevant evidence where it presents a danger of
unfair prejudice or confusion.34 However, this balancing test is weight-
ed heavily in favor of admissibility and against exclusion.m7 Thus,
Rules 401 to 403 embody a clear preference for allowing the jury to
see or hear information that bears on the case. Labeled by one commenta-
tor a principle of "assumptive admissibility," this inclusive approach
is vividly evident in Rule 401.
The definition of relevant evidence set forth in Rule 401 requires
only a nexus between the evidence and the proposition for which it is
offered.349 Evidence is relevant if (1) it has any tendency to establish
a proposition and (2) the proposition is one of consequence to the
determination of the action or charge.350 The "tendency" may be one
rooted in formal logic or, more frequently, in the common experience
of human beings. Put another way, relevancy is not an exclusively legal
343. This is especially true of character evidence. See, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 404(b) (explicitly
permitting the use of "other act" evidence to prove propositions other than "conduct in conformity
to character").
344. FED. R. EviD. 401.
345. FED. R. EvID. 402.
346. 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 5214.
347. Id.
348. LILLY, supra note 11, § 2.4, at 33.
349. FED. R. EviD. 401.
350. Id.
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construct, but one that involves a rational relationship between the
evidence and the proposition it is offered to support.as ' .
The expansive nature of relevancy under Rule 401 virtually guarantees
that most evidence will have some "tendency" to establish a number
of different propositions. This principle of multiple admissibility is
the product of the low threshold of relevancy combined with the nearly
limitless capacity of the human imagination to link evidence (albeit
sometimes tenuously) to a host of different propositionsma 2 For exam-
ple, evidence that a defendant shot the victim once is relevant to show
both an intent to kill (the prosecution's theory) and the defense of
accident. Undoubtedly, the prosecutor will argue that the single shot
shows that the defendant coolly took careful aim while the defense will
contend that it is equally consistent with an accidental discharge ("Surely
the defendant would have fired more than once had he intended to kill
the victim!"). Thus, each side is free to argue the competing inferences
that favor their theories of the case.
Problems with the elastic nature of relevancy surface primarily where
the law precludes the use of some of the relevant propositions that flow
from the evidence. Thus, an item of evidence may have some tendency
to show both propositions #1 and #2, but some other rule (substantive
or evidentiary) might forbid the use of the evidence to show #1. Indeed
Article IV of the Federal Rules of Evidence is replete with rules that
allow evidence to be used for some purposes, but not others as3 For
example, Rule 407 permits evidence of subsequent remedial measures
to prove propositions like ownership or control over the property, or
351. 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 5165, at 55-56.
352. The Supreme Court provided a fine illustration of such ingenuity in Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786. 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993). The Court
observed that the "phases of the moon" can give rise to alternative arguments of more or less
validity:
The study of the phases of the moon, for example, may provide valid scientific
"knowledge" about whether a certain night was dark, and if darkness is a fact in issue,
the knowledge will assist the trier of fact. However (absent creditable grounds supporting
such a link), evidence that the moon was full on a certain night will not assist the
trier of fact in determining whether an individual was unusually likely to have behaved
irrationally on that night.
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591.
353. See FED. R. EvID. 401-412.
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to impeach witnesses 54 But the remedial measure cannot, in theory,
be used to prove negligence or culpability on the part of the party who
so acted.35"
Evidence that is permissible for one purpose but not for others raises
the problem of limited admissibility. Rule 105 provides: "When evidence
which is admissible as to one party or for one purpose but not admissible
as to another party or for another purpose is admitted, the court, upon
request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the
jury accordingly." 6 The rule is beguilingly simple on its face but
difficult to apply. Moreover, its operation is directly affected by Rule
401, defining relevancy, and Rule 103, which governs the timing and
content of objections." 7 Read in the context of these other rules, Rule
105 provides that evidence may be used for any relevant purpose unless
its use is restricted (i.e., "limited") at the time that the evidence is
received. A judge may limit the use of evidence sua sponte, upon the
motion of the party offering it, or upon a "request" (or objection) by
opposing counsel.3 "5 A limiting instruction must be given "upon re-
quest" of any party.m9 The judge has the discretion to determine
whether it is feasible to allow the evidence's use for certain prescribed
purposes.' Put another way, the judge must assess the residual rele-
vance of the evidence for the authorized purpose in light of the risk
that a jury might misuse the evidence as proof of the "forbidden infer-
ence." 6 And in nearly all cases the only guarantee against misuse
is the force and cogency of the limiting instruction.
The limiting instruction, then, plays the Orwellian role of the "thought
police" during the trial. 2 The instruction is effectuated through the
354. FED. R. EVID. 407.
355. Id.; see 23 WRiGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 5285 (1980).
356. FED. R. Evi). 105.
357. FED. R. Evm. 103, 401.
358. See FED. R. EvID. 105.
359. Id.
360. See id.
361. See Daniel D. Blinka, Delusion or Despair: The Concept of Limited Admissibility
in the Law of Evidence, 13 AM. I. TRIAL ADvoc. 781 (1990).
362. See generally GEORGE ORwELL, 1984 (1949).
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assumption that the jury follows any and all instructions. This assumption
is, however, a ruse that rests more upon wishful thinking and doctrinal
necessity than proven experience. 3  Moreover, trial lawyers are aware
that limited admissibility sometimes fosters a shell game in which
evidence is put before the jury for one purpose, but the proponent knows
(or hopes) that the jury will draw the nearly irresistible "forbidden"
inference.3" There is scant empirical support generally for the proposi-
tion that juries follow, or even comprehend, limiting instructions.'
The assumption necessarily remains uncontradicted because nearly all
evidence to the contrary is incompetent and cannot be used to impeach
the jury's verdict.3" Thus, the limiting instruction serves a dual func-
tion: it educates the jury to some degree and, more importantly, serves
as the law's fictive model of how the jury "actually" analyzed the
evidence.
Limited admissibility poses especially difficult problems where the
distinction between the permissible and impermissible propositions are
363. Trial lawyers treat the rule as a rank fiction susceptible to manipulation. See, e.g.,
Stephen D. Easton, The Real World Rules of Evidence, PRAC. LITIGATOR, Jan. 1996, at 49,
59 (positing that in the "real world" of trial law .'[I]imited admissibility' is afantasy"). See
also Rice, supra note 2, at 585; Epps, supra note 2, at 73 n.91 (suggesting "a creative attorney
can point out in closing argument that the other side's case is indeed less substantial than it
appears, emphasizing that much of the appealing evidence is of limited legal value").
364. See, e.g., James W. McElhaney, Limited Admissibility: Keeping Evidence on Track,
A.B.A. J., Feb. 1993, at 81. Professor McElhaney explains this in strong terms:
Limited admissibility often guarantees that the jury will use the evidence improperly.
Say the truck driver's bad driving record is inadmissible to show he was driving
carelessly, but is admissible to show that his employer was negligent in entrusting
him with a dangerous instrumentality. Put in traditional legal trappings, the limited
instruction is merely hard to understand. Put in real English it becomes absurd. "Ladies
and gentlemen of the jury, the truck driver's bad driving record does not show he was
driving carelessly. It only shows that his employer was careless for hiring such a bad
driver."
Id. at 81-82.
365. See Kerri L. Pickel, Inducing Jurors to Disregard Inadmissible Evidence: A Legal
Explanation DoesNot Help, 19 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 407 (1995); Paul Bergman, Admonishing
Jurors to Disregard What They Haven't Heard, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 689 (1992) (addressing
instructions to the jury on the "absence" of certain kinds of evidence); see also J. Alexander
Tanford, The Law and Psychology of Jury Instructions, 69 NEB. L. REv. 71, 76 (1990). Professor
Tanford observes that in some cases limiting instructions have had the opposite effect. See
id. at 86-87, 95, 106.
366. FED. R. EVID. 606; see Mark Cammack, The Jurisprudence of Jury Trials: The No
Impeachment Rule and the Conditions for Legitimate Legal Decisionmaking, 64 U. COLO. L.
REv. 57 (1993).
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technically abstruse or entirely illusory. For example, the difference
between using a statement as proof of the matter asserted and using
it to show only the declarant's state of mind probably exceeds the grasp
of even the brightest lay juror. Evidence textbooks belabor the distinction
for law students who may spend hours struggling to comprehend it with
the assistance of study aids.367 Yet, the law presumes that a short
instruction is all that the lay jury needs in order to properly understand
the limited purpose for which the evidence is offered. 368 And other
distinctions may be even more diaphanous than the subtle workings
of the hearsay rule.36 9
Ordinarily the law of evidence is satisfied with the mechanism of
the limiting instruction. In rare instances courts have gone to the extreme
of requiring a written promise by the jury to use the evidence for only
a limited purpose. Yet written promises serve only to provide a vivid
reminder that the jury should afford the evidence special consideration.
It is doubtful that they "teach" the jury anything about what it can or
cannot do with the evidence.37 °
Occasionally the courts have frankly acknowledged the fictive nature
of limited admissibility and eschewed its use. One prime example is
the admissibility of post-arrest statements by accomplices. 37' The
Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the idea of inter-locking confessions
whereby post-arrest statements are introduced in multiple defendant
trials ostensibly against only the person who made the particular state-
ment.3 7 2 The Court recognized:
367. See, e.g., BLINKA, supra note 230, § 801.
368. Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 403, 111 S. Ct. 1884, 1892, 114 L. Ed. 2d 432, 448
(1991) (describing the "sound presumption of appellate practice" which holds "jurors are reasonable
and generally follow the instructions they are given").
369. The premier example is, no doubt, the character rule. See texa accompanying notes
389-407; see also Edward Imwinkelried, The Use of Evidence of an Accused's Uncharged
Misconduct to Prove Mens Rea: The Doctrines Which Threaten to Engulf the Character Evidence
Prohibition, 51 OHIO ST. LJ. 575 (1990).
370. See United States v. DeCarlo, 458 F.2d 358, 365 (3d Cir. 1972).
371. See generally Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 107 S. Ct. 1702, 96 L. Ed. 2d 176
(1987) (discussing the deprivation of the right to confront when a non-testifying codefendant's
statement is admitted).
372. See Richardson, 481 U.S. at 209-10; Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 193-94, 107
S. Ct. 1714, 1719, 95 L. Ed. 2d 162, 172 (1987). For example, A and B are arrested for murder
and A tells the police that B was the shooter and that he (A) was only the driver. In the meantime,
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The rule that juries are presumed to follow their instructions is a
pragmatic one, rooted less in the absolute certitude that the presumption
is true than in the belief that it represents a reasonable practical accommo-
dation of the interests of the state and the defendant in the criminal
justice process.3"
Such accomplice statements must be wholly excluded or redacted to
eliminate any reference to the non-declarant/defendant, unless the
statement is independently admissible against other defendants under
a hearsay exception. 4
The cases concerning post-arrest statements by accomplices are,
however, distinct exceptions to a rule that favors the admissibility of
evidence for limited purposes regardless of the efficacy of limiting
instructions. And the general rule is frequently invoked where lawyers
want to place otherwise inadmissible evidence before the jury for the
alleged purpose of explaining the basis for an expert's opinion.
2. Inadmissibility and Rule 703
The common law's hypothetical question and personal knowledge
doctrines primarily addressed the expert's reliance on hearsay. But case
law applying Rule 703 reveals that experts are now asked to validate
more than hearsay; in particular, lawyers use experts in an attempt to
evade the prohibitions against character evidence.3 ' s The issue, then,
is whether Rule 703's reasonable reliance requirement is confined to
hearsay or, instead, embraces any evidentiary disability.
The text of Rule 703 is broad and unambiguous: if the information
is of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in forming opinions, "the
B tells the police that he saw A shoot the victim but that he (B) played only a peripheral role
in the killing. In a joint trial, the rule of limited admissibility would opeiate to allow A's statement
to be used only against A and B's statement only against B. However, the odds are great that
a jury, or any reasonable human being, would commingle the statements and at some level
use both statements against both defendants. See Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 106 S. Ct. 2056,
90 L. Ed. 2d 514 (1986) (bench trial for murder in which both the prosecutor and the judge
intermingled the statements).
373. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 211.
374. Id.
375. See United States v. Walls, 70 F.3d 1323, 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United States v.
Miller, 874 F.2d 1255, 1280 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Hill, 655 F.2d 512, 516 (3d Cir.
1981).
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facts or data need not be admissible in evidence." 376 Nothing in the
rule's text restricts the range of inadmissibility to hearsay problems.
Thus, the plain meaning of Rule 703 supports the interpretation that
expert validation can override virtually any exclusionary rule.31 More-
over, nothing else in Article VII suggests otherwise.3
Nor does the Advisory Committee's Note indicate that the drafters
intended to restrict the field of inadmissibility. Concededly, the Advisory
Committee's analysis was directed exclusively at the hearsay problem,
but this does not mean that the Committee limited Rule 703 to hearsay.
After all, the common law had obsessed about the hearsay problem so
it was reasonable to expect that the Advisory Committee would address
the hearsay objection in its short note. The Note's ambiguity, therefore,
suggests nothing that would narrowly confine "inadmissibility" to hearsay
defects.
The sparse commentary on Rule 703 does not provide a clear answer
either. First, relatively little attention has been paid to Rule 703,
especially in contrast to the many works devoted to Rule 702.
Second, commentators tend to follow the case law, most of which raise
hearsay issues; thus, they dwell more on the expert's reasonable reliance
and disclosure to the jury than the scope of inadmissibility.' Although
some authority restricts Rule 703 to hearsay problems,3' more often
commentators assume that all kinds of inadmissibility are covered.m2
Notwithstanding potential ambiguity in the rule, the note, and the
commentary, the case law clearly reveals that lawyers use Rule 703
376. FED. R. EVID. 703.
377. See Edward W. Cleary, Preliminary Notes on Reading the Rules of Evidence, 57 NEB.
L. REV. 908, 911 (1978) (on plain meaning).
378. Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 367 (discussing the need to read the rules in the context
of one another).
379. See supra note 2.
380. See, e.g., 1 McCORIUCK II, supra note 60, § 15, at 65 (the "key language" in Rule
703 "consists of the words, 'reasonably relied upon' as further modified in the rule").
381. See, e.g., Rice, supra note 2, at 588.
382. See, e.g., GRAHAM, supra note 334, § 703.1, at 112-13 ("For most but not all practical
purposes, Rule 703 operates as the equivalent of an additional exception to the rule against
hearsay. For all purposes, Rule 703 creates an exception to the Original Writing Rule, Rule
1002, and serves as an alternative method of satisfying the requirement of authentication.");
CHRISTOPHER B. MuELLER & LAIRD KIRKPATRICK, EvIDENcE § 7.12 (1995).
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to reach all forms of inadmissibility.3 Furthermore, the case law
has not manifested any design to limit inadmissibility to only certain
species of evidentiary objections.
Hearsay remains, far and away, the most common disability. Courts
frequently warn that experts must be more than hearsay conduits.3M
Although hearsay covers any out-of-court statement offered for the truth
of the matter asserted,38s courts are reluctant to allow expert witnesses
to recount the opinions of nontestifying experts unless they serve as
building blocks for the witness's own conclusions?" In cases involving
medical experts, for example, courts have held that Rule 703 permits
a testifying expert to predicate his opinion on diagnoses rendered by
nontestifying medical experts.W In sum, the cases permit reliance
only on subsidiary opinions that support the testifying expert's conclu-
sions, but preclude reliance on those that are identical to the opinions
offered by the testifying expert.m
Rule 703 is also used to circumvent the general ban against propensity
evidence under Rule 404(a).389 Two cases illustrate the difficulty.
383. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1150, 1156-62 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 266 (1995). In Johnson, a detective testified as an expert on the organization of
a drug conspiracy by using an "organizational chart." Id. at 1157. Affirming the district court,
the Fourth Circuit expressed concern about the "Government's practice of offering summary
witness testimony and charts into evidence in federal drug prosecutions." Id. at 1158.
384. Id.
385. FED. R. EVID. 801(3).
386. SeeO'Geev. Dobbs House, Inc., 570F.2d 1084,1087 (2dCir. 1978). The trial judge,
Jack Weinstein, permitted the plaintiff's expert, who had been specifically retained for purposes
of litigation, to testify to double hearsay. Id. at 1088-89. Specifically, the doctor testified
"not only to what O'Gee had told him about her condition and its genesis, but also to what
O'Gee had told him that the other doctors had told her about her injuries." Id. Upholding
the decision to permit this testimony, the court pointed to both Rule 803(4) and the fact that
the testifying expert had also relied on various medical reports and records that related to the
plaintiff's treatment history. Without citing Rule 703, the court cryptically noted that it was
not deciding what "leeway extends to the kind of multiple hearsay that would have been present
here in the absence of the doctors' reports." Id. at 1089. Interestingly, it was Judge Weinstein
himself who later explicitly linked O'Gee to Rule 703. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab.
Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1245-46 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), affid, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987). For
an excellent discussion of O'Gee in the context of Rule 703, see Edward B. Arnolds, Federal
Rule of Evidence 703: The Backdoor is Wide Open, 20 FORUM 1 (1984).
387. See Gong v. Hirsch, 913 F.2d 1269, 1273 n.3 (7th Cir. 1990) (collecting and discussing
the cases).
388. Imwinkelried, supra note 341, at 263.
389. See FED. R. EViD. 404(a).
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Nachtsheim v. Beech Aircraft Corp.3 90 involved a products liability
action arising out of an air crash. To prove causation and the dangerous
condition of the airplane, the plaintiff attempted to introduce evidence
about the crash of an identical airplane which occurred one year after
the crash under litigation.391 The trial judge excluded the evidence
because there were too few "established" facts to justify any meaningful
comparisons.3  With enviable alacrity and persistence, plaintiff's
counsel then argued that his air crash expert should be permitted to testify
about the later crash because the expert relied upon it in formulating
his opinion. 393 The trial judge allowed the expert's opinion, but preclud-
ed any mention of the subsequent crash.394 Affirming on both issues,
the Seventh Circuit explained that Rule 703 permits an expert to rely
on inadmissible evidence but does not guarantee its disclosure to the
jury even for limited purposes. 39
For present purposes, the telling point is that Nachtsheim tacitly
recognizes that Rule 703 must be harmonized with other exclusionary
rules, such as the general proscription against propensity evidence.396
Nachtsheim also attests to the significance of carefully distinguishing
among the three different issues raised by Rule 703: the scope of
inadmissibility, the expert's reliance on such evidence, and what should
be disclosed to the jury about such bases. 97 A judge's resolution
of the reliance and disclosure issues are directly related to the reasons
why the evidence is inadmissible to start with.
Potential misuse of Rule 703 is dramatically shown in Henson v.
Triumph Trucking, Inc.,39s which involved a 1989 rear-end collision
between the plaintiffs bus and the defendant's truck. The defendant
contended that the plaintiff had fallen asleep while driving the bus due,
390. 847 F.2d 1261 (7th Cir. 1988).
391. Nachtsheim, 847 F.2d at 1267.
392. Id. at 1267.
393. Id. at 1270.
394. See id. at 1265.
395. Id. at 1270-71; see infra text accompanying notes 431-33.
396. See Nachisheim, 847 F.2d 1261.
397. See id.
398. 180 Ariz. 305, 884 P.2d 191 (CL App. 1994).
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in part, to drowsiness brought on by the overuse of Xanax, an anti-anxiety
drug that sometimes induces sleepiness.3" Not content with challenging
the plaintiff's testimony about how much Xanax he had taken, the
defendant introduced evidence that the plaintiff had misused other drugs
in 1980, 1982, 1985, and 1988." The trial judge allowed the evidence
on the theory that because the plaintiff "had misused prescription drugs
in the past, he was probably presently misusing Xanax. '4 1 The appel-
late court reversed.4 2 It was obvious that proving drug misuse in
1989 through proof of earlier drug misuse ran squarely afoul of Rule
404(a).403 However, the defense argued that the drug history was
"admissible" under Rule 703. 4 The appellate court conceded that
it was "incontestable that physicians reasonably rely on clinical history
in reaching conclusions.'" Nevertheless, two rationales precluded
the introduction of the drug history under Rule 703. First, the jury did
not require expert assistance "to understand the simple proposition that
if a person has done something often before, it is more likely that it
will have been done again."'4 6 Second, if Rule 703 permitted parties
to "'launder' character evidence.... the rule excluding character evidence
will have been effectively eliminated.,
407
Henson clearly exemplifies some of the key problems with Rule 703.
The character rules undisputedly barred the use of the drug history
evidence yet it was conceded that physicians reasonably rely on clinical
history in diagnosing maladies.4 Nevertheless, the court was plainly
399. Henson, 884 P.2d at 192.
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. Id. at 193.
403. Id. at 192-93. Arizona's corresponding evidentiary rule is identical to Federal Rule
404(a). See ARIZ. R. EvID. 404(a) (West 1996).
404. Henson, 884 P.2d at 193. Arizona has adopted an identical rule to Federal Rule 703.
See Axz. R. EVID. 703 (West 1996).
405. Henson, 884 P.2d at 193. One could argue, however, that the court framed the issue
too broadly. Doctors rely on clinical history to treat patient's present symptoms. Less clear
is whether doctors regularly use one clinical fact (e.g., the earlier drug use) to determine the




408. d. at 192-93.
[Vol. 20:467
HeinOnline  -- 20 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 538 1996-1997
FEDERAL RuLE OF EVIDENCE 703
upset by the prospect that the character rules could be circumvented
by laundering the evidence through an expert. 4" Only one solution
remained: permit the physician's opinion but preclude him from relating
the drug history on which it rested.410
The court's approach was pragmatic. Doctors use medical history
for purposes of diagnoses and treatment; past occurrences are simply
one factor in determining what to do with the patient at present. In
court, however, the danger existed that the evidence of past drug misuse
would be used to prove yet another historical fact: the driver's drug
abuse on the night of the accident. Supported by common sense, the
inference is nevertheless precluded by the law of evidence. 411 Thus,
the only practical way of accommodating the doctor's use of the evidence
while maintaining the integrity of the evidence rules was to allow the
opinion but to bar the proponent from disclosing this particular bases.412
Rule 703, then, has the potential to undo any exclusionary rule of
evidence.4U It is not enough, however, merely to note that the rule
applies to evidence that is inadmissible for any reason. Rather, it must
be recognized that the nature of the disability affects the issues of
reasonable reliance and, most importantly, disclosure to the jury.
3. Reasonable Reliance
Rule 104(a) governs preliminary questions of admissibility.4 4 In
the context of Rule 703, the judge determines whether the inadmissible
409. See Henson, 884 P.2d at 193.
410. Id. The physician testified that "more Xanax was used on August 27 than Henson
admitted." Id.
411. See FED. R. EviD. 404(a).
412. See Michael L. Seigel, A Pragmatic Critique of Modern Evidence Scholarship, 88
Nw. U. L. REV. 995, 1017-19 (1994) (arguing that evidence law is too narrowly focused on
the goal of determining objective historical truth and must consider other values, such as the
acceptability of verdicts and the value of trial as "ritual and theater"). Since doctors rely on
the evidence for a use proscribed by the legal system, introduction of the evidence creates a
real danger that it will be "overvalued" by the jury. See 1 MCCORMIcK II, supra note 60,
§ 15.
413. Constitutional mandates can override Rule 703. See Carlson, Collision Course, supra
note 2, at 242; Robert H. Rhode, Note, The Scope of the Reasonable Reliance Requirement
of Federal Rule of Evidence 703, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 1069.
414. FED. R. EvID. 104(a).
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data is of a type that experts in the field reasonably rely upon in drawing
opinions or inferences.4 The judge makes this determination by
a preponderance of the evidence.416 Moreover, in deciding this question,
the judge is not bound by any other rules of evidence, except those rules
regarding privileges.41 7
But how does a judge determine reasonable reliance? In particular,
how much deference are experts entitled to on this issue? Can they
self-define reasonable reliance in their respective fields or are there
objective limits as to what an expert can rely on? The case law reveals
two prevailing views on these issues which reflect the sparse options:
the so-called "liberal" and "restrictive" approaches.
The liberal approach is "expert friendly." In effect, reasonable reliance
is equated with the custom or regular practice of experts in the field.418
Judges are not free, then, to develop their own criteria of reasonable
reliance; it is the experts themselves who determine what they rely
upon.419 What other experts do, or have done, is often the most impor-
tant criterion. For example, in Baumholser v. Amax Coal Co.,420 a
geologist testified about the results of a survey conducted by college
students on damages caused by local blasting. Although unidentified
flaws excluded the survey as substantive evidence, the geologist could
rely on its findings because it was "uncontradicted and unrebutted" that
415. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994).
416. See generally Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 107 S. Ct. 2775, 97 L. Ed.
2d 144 (1987).
417. Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 178 (construing Rule 104(a), the Court held that the trial judge
can properly consider the hearsay itself when deciding whether the foundation for a hearsay
exception has been satisfied; the burden of proof for such preliminary facts is a preponderance
of the evidence).
418. See Imwinkelried, supra note 341, at 265.
419. 1 MCCORMICK II, supra note 60, § 15, at 65; In re Japanese Elec. Prods., 723 F.2d
238, 276-77 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd, 475 U.S. 576, questioned by In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB
Litig. 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding "legal error" where the trial judge "substituted its
own views of reasonable reliance for those of the experts"). Judge Weinstein stated: "The
more liberal view ... allows the expert to base an opinion on data of the type reasonably relied
upon by experts in the field without separately determining the trustworthiness of the particular
data involved." In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1244 (ED.N.Y.
1985), ofd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987) (citation omitted).
420. 630 F.2d 550, 552 (7th Cir. 1980).
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this survey was similar to one conducted by the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion.
The restrictive view demands more than customary practice, requiring
some showing that the facts or data are trustworthy.422 In short, the
judge does not blindly defer to expert practice. There is disagreement,
however, on the nature and extent of the indicia of trustworthiness.
Some authority looks to tort cases, where evidence of industry custom
is admissible but not dispositive of reasonableness. 423 Other authority
frames trustworthiness exclusively in hearsay terms, thus reducing
reliability to an ill-defined search for an exception to the hearsay rule.4u
Neither the liberal nor the restrictive approach help very much when
the experts conflict over reasonable reliance or where the record is silent.
Occasionally, the cases reveal experts at war not just over the ultimate
opinions, but also over the kinds of information that "good" experts
reasonably rely upon.42 In addition, judges rely on judicial notice
to determine when experts can reasonably rely upon such information.426
421. Id.; see also United States v. Lawson, 653 F.2d 299, 302 n.7 (7th Cir. 1981) (judicial
notice taken "that psychiatrists customarily use" such information as staff reports, interviews
with other physicians, and other background information in rendering diagnoses).
422. 1 MCCORMIcK IL supra note 60, § 15, at 65; Imwinkelried, supra note 341, at 266.
Judge Weinstein summarized the restrictive view in this way: "The more restrictive view requires
the trial court to determine not only whether the data are of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the field, but also whether the underlying data are untrustworthy for hearsay or other
reasons." Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. at 1244.
423. Imwinkelried, supra note 341, at 266.
424. See 1 MCCRMIcK II, supra note 60, § 15, at 65 ("There is also a restrictive approach
to the effect that if the data would have been or was excluded from the record as hearsay and
can not meet a test of circumstantial trustworthiness for an exception to the hearsay rules, the
standard of Rule 703 is not met."). The problem with this approach is that if the excluded
"hearsay" does meet the standards for an exception (e.g., Rule 803(24)), it is then admissible
evidence and there is no need to worry about the expert's reasonable reliance on inadmissible
evidence.
425. See Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. at 1245 (discussing In re Swine Flu Immunization
Prod. Liab. Litig., 508 F. Supp. 897 (D. Colo. 1981), affd sub nom. Lima v. United States,
708 F.2d 502 (10th Cir. 1983)). In the Swine Flu case, the court excluded a doctor's opinion
because it was not based on sufficiently reliable information. Swine Flu, 508 F. Supp. at 903.
The underlying data involved statistics on diseases culled from various computer data bases
by medical clerks. Id. Although the medical expert "testified that epidemiologists would rely
on this type of data," two other experts disagreed. Id. at 904.
426. Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp at 1246 (excluding expert's opinion based on defective
bases: "The court takes judicial notice-based on hundreds of trials--that no reputable physician
relies on hearsay checklists by litigants to reach a conclusion with respect to the cause of their
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Reasonable reliance has been a headache in toxic tort cases involving
statistical data,42 7 but it is potentially a greater problem with social
science-type experts, such as social workers, who conceivably consider
all "relevant" evidence.42 Where does the judge draw the line between
permissible and impermissible (i.e., reasonable and unreasonable) reliance
in the softer sciences?
429
One must also consider the possible stakes in contests over reasonable
reliance. In some cases the issue is outcome determinative, such as
where the judge's finding that a basis is impermissible has a catastrophic
domino-type effect on the proponent's case. The impermissible basis
leads to the exclusion of the opinion which in turn tears fatal rents into
the party's prima facie case.43 It would seem, however, that the stakes
are less extreme in most other cases. A finding that a basis is impermissi-
ble might dent the expert's opinion, but often the expert will be able
to point to other permissible bases that support her conclusions. Thus,
in Nachtsheim v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,431 the air crash expert was
permitted to offer his opinion about the airplane's defects despite the
court's insistence that evidence of the subsequent plane crash was
inadmissible under the "similar accidents" doctrine and that it could
not be disclosed to the jury for a limited purpose under Rule 703.432
Indeed, Nachtsheim illustrates that the liberal and restrictive approaches
sometimes conflate several distinct issues.43 Both tests muddle the
afflictions" (citations omitted)); United States v. Lawson, 653 F.2d 299, 302 (7th Cir. 1981)
(allowing opinion); Henson v. Triumph Trucking, Inc., 180 Ariz. 305, 307, 884 P.2d 191, 193
(CL App. 1994) (finding it "incontestable" that physicians reasonably rely on "clinical history").
427. See Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. at 1247-48; Wilson v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,
893 F.2d 1149, 1153 (10th Cir. 1990).
428. See, e.g., Lawson, 653 F.2d at 302 n.7 (observing that psychiatrists customarily use
virtually all of a patient's medical and life history in arriving at conclusions).
429. See David McCord, Syndromes, Profiles and Other Mental Exotica: A New Approach
to the Admissibility of Nontraditional Psychological Evidence in Criminal Cases, 66 OR. L.
REV. 19 (1987).
430. See Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. at 1256-60.
431. 847 F.2d 1261 (7th Cir. 1988).
432. Nachtsheim, 847 F.2d at 1270 n. 11. The Nachtsheim court focused on the disclosure
issue; it is unclear whether the parties litigated the reasonable reliance issue. Nevertheless,
it seems highly likely that even if the court had ruled that the expert could not reasonably rely
on the evidence of the other crash, the opinion would have been adequately supported by the
remaining bases, particularly the expert's study of the facts surrounding the crash being litigated.
433. See id. at 1261.
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expert's reliance with disclosure to the jury, giving scant attention to
why the evidence was initially ruled inadmissible. Reasonable reliance
cuts directly to the admissibility of the expert's opinion; that is, what
information does the expert need in order to reach a conclusion?
Disclosure relates, however, to how much information the jury needs
in order to assess the opinion. The liberal approach is both practical
and justified, if limited to its proper sphere of allowing the expert to
use the information he customarily relies upon in reaching an opinion.
However, it is the judge, not the expert, who must control what the jury
is told about the facts of the case, consistent with the rules of evidence.
4. Disclosure of the Experts' Bases
What should the jury be told about the bases of the expert's opinion?
Where the bases consists of admissible evidence, there are no problems:
the evidence is already before the jury for all relevant purposes, unless
otherwise expressly restricted. For example, medical records admitted
as records of regularly conducted activities may be considered for the
truth of the matter asserted." Other act evidence admitted to show
intent, motive, etc., can be used for these purposes by both the expert
and the jury.43
Disclosure of inadmissible bases has triggered much greater consterna-
tion among the courts and commentators who struggle to apply Rules
703 and 705. Three positions have emerged. First, one school views
Rule 703 as transforming inadmissible evidence into admissible evidence
through the miracle of expert validation.4m The second, more modest
approach contends that Rule 703 permits disclosure of the inadmissible
bases but only for the limited purpose of explaining the expert's opin-
ion.43 7  The third position stubbornly reminds us that inadmissible
evidence under Rule 703 remains inadmissible; thus, the rule permits
434. FED. R. EviD. 803(6); see supra notes 252-55 and accompanying text.
435. In the case of other act evidence admitted for a limited purpose, such as showing intent,
the admissibility is restricted to this use; that is, the expert cannot use it as proof of bad character
without raising the inadmissibility problems addressed in the text that follows.
436. See, e.g., Walker 1. Blakey, An Introduction to the Oklahoma Evidence Code: The
Thirty-Fourth Hearsay Exception, 16 TULSA L.J. 1, 34 (1980); Rice, supra note 2, at 588.
437. See, e.g., Imwinkelried, supra note 341, at 267.
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the expert's opinion predicated on the inadmissible bases; yet disclosure,
for any purpose, still rests with the discretion of the trial court.4m
The first approach construes Rule 703 as creating admissible evidence
through the agency of expert validation.439 Champions of this view
occasionally label Rule 703 as a "hearsay exception," thus reflecting
the general preoccupation with bases rendered inadmissible solely because
of hearsay defects." Professor Blakey, for example, contends that
the rule created the "thirty-fourth hearsay exception" under the Oklahoma
rules."' The courts, too, occasionally label Rule 703 as a hearsay
442exception.
Two primary arguments support the view that Rule 703 converts
inadmissible into admissible evidence. First, there is a sense that expert
validation provides sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness to warrant
admissibility; in short, if it's good enough for experts in the field, it
should be good enough for the courts.443 The second reason sounds
in desperation born of a lack of viable alternatives. Not only is it
"logical" to enlighten the trier of fact about how the expert reached
her conclusions, but it is fatuous to think that the evidence can be received
for some other limited purpose. 4
438. See, e.g., Carlson, Collision Course, supra note 2; Carlson, Policing, supra note 2.
439. See, e.g., Blakey, supra note 436, at 34; Rice, supra note 2, at 588.
440. See, e.g., Blakey, supra note 436, at 34; Rice, supra note 2, at 588.
441. Blakey, supra note 436, at 11. Oklahoma's rule is identical to federal Rule 703.
See OKXA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2703 (West 1996).
442. E.g., Bagnowski v. Preway, Inc., 138 Wis. 2d 241, 251-52, 405 N.W.2d 746, 751
(Ct. App. 1987) (labeling the identical Wisconsin rule as "another hearsay exception"). The
Wisconsin Supreme Court obliquely retracted the holding in Bagnowski by cryptically observing
that Wisconsin's Rule of Evidence 703 "is not to be confused with a 'hearsay exception,"'
but offered lower courts no further guidance on how such evidence should be handled. Kolpin
v. Pioneer Power & Light Co., 162 Wis. 2d 1, 37 n.10, 469 N.W.2d 595, 610 n.10 (1991).
443. Rice, supra note 2, at 588; Blakey, supra note 436, at 34. Professor Rice argues,
however, that validation embraces not only the expert's customary reliance on the "kind" of
information at issue, but whether the expert acquired the information in a manner "that is consistent
with the profession's standards." Rice, supra note 2, at 589. Thus, the medical history checklists
at issue in Agent Orange failed this part of Rice's test. Id. at 589.
444. Professor Rice argues that "[aidmitting an expert's opinion, but not its basis, is illogical
because one cannot accept an opinion as true without implicitly accepting the facts upon which
the expert based that opinion." Rice, supra note 2, at 585. He also refers to limiting instructions
as "pure fiction." Id.; see also Blakey, supra note 436, at 14, 34.
[Vol. 20:467
HeinOnline  -- 20 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 544 1996-1997
FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 703
There are several major problems with the argument that Rule 703
creates admissible evidence. The text of the rule itself belies this
conclusion by stating only that "the facts or data need not be admissible
in evidence.""s If Rule 703 generates admissible evidence, the phrase
"need not be admissible" is reduced to surplusage or an absurdity. At
any rate, such a contorted construction must be avoided.44  Nor does
the Advisory Committee's Note provide any compelling support for
this position. More significantly, viewing Rule 703 as a "hearsay
exception" focuses on just one facet of inadmissibility. What about
the rules proscribing character evidence or evidence of subsequent
remedial measures for certain purposes? What about evidentiary
privileges? In short, neither the rule's text nor its legislative history
supports the argument that Rule 703 created a "blackhole" into which
all evidence is sucked and transformed into admissible evidence based
on an expert's routine use of it in drawing inferences. 447
A second view of Rule 703 attempts to balance the jury's need to
fully assess the expert's opinion with the integrity of the other exclusion-
ary rules.448 The balance is struck by "admitting" the "inadmissible"
bases for the limited purpose of explaining the expert's opinion."49
The strength of this position rests in its apparent reasonableness (it seems
like a just compromise) and the deeply entrenched acceptance of limited
admissibility under federal rules' practice.4s° Moreover, limited admissi-
bility has roots in some of the authority that inspired Rule 703.451
445. FED. R. EviD. 703 (emphasis added). See Gong v. Hirsch, 913 F.2d 1269, 1273 (7th
Cir. 1990) ("While Rule 703 entitles experts to base their opinion on such information, the
rule does not address the admissibility of the underlying information.").
446. See Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 369-70.
447. Epps, supra note 2, at 64.
448. See id. at 66.
449. See, e.g., Imwinkelried, supra note 341, at 267 (summarizing this position as follows:
"the information ought to be admitted; but the jury should be given a limiting instruction that
they are to use the information only for the purpose of evaluating the quality of the expert's
reasoning process") (citation omitted).
450. See supra part llI.D.1; see also Epps, supra note 2, at 80 n.117 (stating that "[t]he
distinction between using evidence for all purposes and using it for a limited purpose is at
the heart of Rule 105").
451. Rheingold, for example, observed that"much that is technically hearsay is being admitted
as basis statement today, not on any established exception to the rule, but by virtue of some
sort of ad hoc exception for medical testimony, the right of the doctor to use technically incompe-
tent evidence." Rheingold, supra note 98, at 529.
1997]
HeinOnline  -- 20 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 545 1996-1997
AMERICAN JOURNAL oF TRIAL ADVOCACY
There are, however, substantial problems with the limited admissibility
approach. For one thing, there are grave difficulties with the technical
requirements governing limited admissibility. Rule 105 provides that
limiting instructions are given "upon request. '  A party's failure
to request a limiting instruction at the time the evidence is admitted
may mean that the jury is free to use it for any relevant purpose. 453
Assuming that the inadmissible basis is favorable to the proponent, the
proponent has little incentive to seek an instruction that limits the possible
uses of the evidence. Thus, the opponent bears the burden of: (1) timely
recognizing that the expert's basis is inadmissible for any number of
reasons and (2) requesting a limiting instruction. 4  Should the opponent
fail to make a timely objection or move to restrict the use of the evidence,
the bases is then admissible by virtue of the opponent's default.
45
Even more troubling is the content of such a limiting instruction.
What would make sense to the jury? Several commentators who agree
on little else dismiss such instructions as nonsense. Professor Rice,
for example, supports the hearsay exception approach to Rule 703, in
part because limiting instructions are "pure fiction.,'0 Professor Carl-
452. Rule 105, Limited Admissibility, reads: "When evidence which is admissible as to
one party or for one purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another purpose is
admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct
the jury accordingly." FED. R. EViD. 105.
453. 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 5065, at 330-31.
454. See Epps, supra note 2, at 72-73.
455. See 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 5065, at 328-30 (discussing the timing
of objections and requests for limiting instructions). Some authority appears to assume that
even though no one requests a limiting instruction, Rule 703 somehow automatically bestows
a limited purpose on the "inadmissible bases." See, e.g., Epps, supra note 2, at 65, 72-73.
The problem is exemplified by Wilson v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 893 F.2d 1149,
1152-54 (10th Cir. 1990), where the court held that the experts could rely on certain charts
that were inadmissible on hearsay grounds. The court observed that the hearsay was "admitted
for the limited purpose of informing the jury of the basis of the expert's opinion and not for
proving the truth of the matter asserted." Wilson, 893 F.2d at 1153. But the court also observed
that the trial judge had not given a limiting instruction, an oversight that it blamed on the opponent,
who had the "burden" of requesting it. Id. at 1153 n.5. The court did not explain how the
evidence was "limited" without any instruction that restricted the use of the evidence.
456. Rice, supra note 2, at 585. Professor Rice explained:
Compounding the absurdity of the approach ... is the court's allowing the expert
to recite the underlying basis, and then instructing the jury not to accept the recited
facts as true (even though the expert did), but to consider those facts only in assessing
the value of the expert's opinion. This instruction is pure fiction; it cannot be done.
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son, who rejects Rice's approach and supports the view that disclosure
of inadmissible bases should be restricted during direct examination,
also concludes that limiting instructions are "no cure." 7
Social science research supports the position that such instructions
do not make much sense to lay jurors (or anyone else). Regina Schuller's
recent study of the influence of "secondhand" information on jury
decision-making cautiously suggests that such instructions are not helpful
to juries (and are probably ignored).4
Common sense alone exposes the absurdity of such instructions.
In effect, we are telling jurors that they should use the evidence in
assessing the persuasiveness of the expert's opinion, but that they cannot
use the evidence for the same purpose that the expert did in the first
place! What does it mean to tell the jury that the evidence is received
solely as it bears on the weight to be given the expert's opinion and
then preclude them from using it in the same way that the expert did?4 9
Moreover, the content of the instruction must turn on why the evidence
is inadmissible in the first place. In the hearsay context, the basis consists
of an out-of-court statement that cannot be used for the truth of the matter
asserted because none of over thirty hearsay exceptions apply. But what
do we tell the jury about an expert who did rely on the statement for
its truth? One possibility is as follows:
Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury. You have heard expert A testify
that she relied on [describe statement] in arriving at her opinion.
You may consider this statement only in assessing the credibility
Even if the instruction's distinction logically were possible, jurors likely would not
be capable of performing such mental gymnastics.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
457. Carlson, Collision Course, supra note 2, at 246 n.49.
458. Regina A. Schuller, Expert Evidence and Hearsay: The Influence of 'Secondhand'
Information on Jurors' Decisions, 19 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 345 (1995).
459. See, e.g., Wilson, 893 F.2d at 1153. The court admitted two charts, which were hearsay
and otherwise excludable, for the limited purpose of fleshing out the grounds for the expert's
opinions regarding the role of the drug Bendectin in causing birth defects. Id. However, the
opponent raised the additional objection that the charts failed to take into account the timing
of the patient's Bendectin consumption. Id. The court held that this flaw went to "weight"
without offering any explanation of how this was to be done, given that the jury was not permitted
to use the chart as substantive evidence anyway. Id. at 1154.
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of A's opinion. You cannot use the statement as proof of [whatever
is described in the statement] even though A herself used it for this
purpose.
In short, we tell the jury to use the evidence in assessing the expert's
opinion, but preclude the jury from using it for the very purpose that
the expert did in reaching the conclusion. Rice and Carlson are correct:
this is nonsense."60
If limiting instructions are nonsensical in the hearsay context, what
are we to do when dealing with even more diaphanous distinctions, such
as the use of character evidence? As we have seen, limited admissibility
allows parties to introduce evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts
ostensibly to prove intent, knowledge, motive, etc., but in theory the
evidence is not received for the forbidden propensity inference.41
Critics correctly point out the considerable risk that limiting instructions
are ineffective and likely to be ignored."62 This risk is the same regard-
less of whether the other evidence stands alone or is filtered through
an expert's testimony.
For example, in Henson v. Triumph Trucking, Inc.,43 the defendant,
through an expert, offered evidence of the plaintiff's misuse of prescrip-
tion medication in 1980, 1982, 1985 and 1988.4" Defense counsel
offered this evidence to support the expert's opinion that plaintiff had
misused Xanax at the time of the 1989 accident."' Without question
the evidence ran "afoul" of the character rule, but it was equally "incon-
testable" that physicians relied on such clinical history in rendering
conclusions."' The court rejected the defendant's argument that Rule
460. At best such instructions might affect the content of the proponent's closing argument.
As one court reminded, in such cases the proponent cannot argue to the jury, '"See, we proved
X through our expert witness, A."' In re James Wilson Assocs., 965 F.2d 160, 173 (7th Cir.
1992). While this is true, it is doubtful that it makes much difference. Trial counsel can describe
fact X, remind the jury that it was received only as it bears on the cogency of expert A's opinion,
and then proceed with confidence that the jury will not grasp the meaningless distinction
embroidered into the instruction.
461. See discussion supra part I11.
462. E.g., Rice, supra note 2, at 585.
463. 180 Ariz. 305, 884 P.2d 191 (Ct. App. 1994).
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703 permitted experts to "'launder' character evidence."'4 7  Opting
for common sense over lawyerly legerdemain, the court trenchantly
concluded: "We do not find edifying the proposition that character
evidence is inadmissible unless an expert relies on the evidence in forming
an opinion in a way that we forbid the trier from relying directly."
A third approach to Rule 703 controls the timing of, and the extent
to which, inadmissible bases are disclosed to the jury."9 In effect,
the restricted disclosure approach limits what the jury can be told about
the expert's inadmissible bases, at least during the direct examination.
Over a decade ago,470 Professor Carlson observed that "[c]ourts have
not always appreciated the fine but important distinction between allowing
an extra-record report to form a basis for courtroom opinion and permit-
ting the whole of the report to come into evidence." 471 Limiting instruc-
tions were ineffectual. 472 The only solution was to recognize the judge's
power to prune the expert's testimony itself, cutting back the expert's
latitude to explain the bases for the opinion in great detail, regardless
of their admissibility. Professor Carlson proposed that experts be
restricted to identifying "the sources" for their conclusions during direct
examination.
The restricted disclosure approach rests, in short, on distinguishing
direct from cross-examination. 474  Given the potential for mischief
467. Id. at 193.
468. Id.
469. See Carlson, Policing, supra note 2, at 583-86.
470. See Carlson, Collision Course, supra note 2; Carlson, Policing, supra note 2. Professor
Carlson has reiterated his support for this position in recent years. Ronald L. Carlson, In Defense
of a Constitutional Theory of Experts, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 1182 (1993).
471. Carlson, Policing, supra note 2, at 584 (footnotes omitted). Carlson also pointed out
that "many courts have understood the vice of free introduction of underlying data." Id.
472. See Carlson, Collision Course, supra note 2, at 246 n.49.
473. Carlson, Policing, supra note 2, at 585. Professor Carlson further explained that
an expert whose opinion required extrinsic data may identify and briefly describe the
supporting out-of-court document that gave rise to his conclusions. To go further and
allow the admission of an unauthenticated writing into evidence or to permit the testifying
expert to quote extensively from that writing violates accepted hearsay norms.
Id. at 584.
474. Id. at 583-86. Professor Carlson analogized Rule 703 to Rule 612, which governs
the procedures where witnesses have refreshed their recollection with writings prior to, or during,
their testimony.
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created by Rule 703, the proponent may be foreclosed from disclosing
more than the type or source of the inadmissible data during the direct
examination. The cross-examiner is, however, allowed more latitude
to explore the inadmissible bases in order to impeach the expert's
opinion.475
Some federal courts have adopted the restricted disclosure approach.
In Nachtsheim v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,476 the Seventh Circuit ruled
that the trial judge had properly allowed an air crash expert to state
his opinion without any reference to another (inadmissible) crash that
he had also relied upon.477 Although Rule 703 permitted the expert
to rely on the inadmissible other accident evidence, the court observed
that "the rule does not indicate whether the expert may reveal to the
jury the factual basis of his opinion if those facts are not independently
admissible into evidence."47 Melding Rule 703 with Rule 403, 47
the Seventh Circuit used what is labeled a "'flexible-liberal approach':
"If the expert opinion is allowed, 'the court may, in its discretion, allow
the expert to reveal to the jury' the information gained from the expert's
pretrial studies and investigations pursued in preparation for expressing
an opinion." Thus, Rule 703 did not trump Rule 403. Trial judges
retain the discretion to decide how much, if any, of the inadmissible
bases should be disclosed to the jury.4"l
475. See Baumholser v. Amax Coal Co., 630 F.2d 550, 553 (7th Cir. 1980).
476. 847 F.2d 1261 (7th Cir. 1988); see supra text accompanying notes 390-96.
477. Nachtsheim, 847 F.2d at 1270-71.
478. Id. at 1270 (footnote omitted).
479. Rule 705 did not figure into the court's analysis. Nachtsheim, 847 F.2d at 1270 n.12.
480. Nachtsheim, 847 F.2d at 1271 (quoting Baumholser v. Amax Coal Co., 630 F.2d 550,
553 (7th Cir. 1980) (internal quotations omitted)). In Baumholser the expert was allowed to
offer an opinion on the damage caused by the defendant's blasting operations. Baumholser,
630 F.2d at 552. The opinion was based on an inadmissible survey conducted by college students
under the expert's direction, but the "uncontradicted and unrebutted" record revealed that it
was similar to one conducted by the Atomic Energy Commission; hence, it passed muster under
Rule 703. Id. Nor was the court troubled by the expert's reliance on "double hearsay." The
"discretion" language quoted above was taken from a 1957 case. The full quote from Baumholser
is: "If the opinion is received, the court may, in its discretion, allow the expert to reveal to
the jury the information gained during such [pretrial] investigations and studies. Wide latitude
in cross-examination should be allowed." Id. at 553 (quoting Standard Oil Co. v. Moore, 251
F.2d 188, 222 (9th Cir. 1957)).
481. Nachtsheim, 847 F.2d at 1270-71.
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Several years later the Seventh Circuit elaborated upon Nachtsheim
in Gong v. Hirsh.4s2 The Gongs brought a medical malpractice action
in federal court alleging that the defendant doctor had negligently
prescribed the drug prednisone to treat Mr. Gong's chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease.4s3 The resulting perforated ulcer allegedly forced
Mr. Gong's premature retirement as an engineer. 4M After Mr. Gong's
subsequent death, his widow amended the complaint to allege that the
negligence had caused his death as well.4s A jury returned a verdict
for the defendant. s6
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the trial court erred in failing
to submit to the jury a letter written by Mr. Gong's family physician,
Dr. Schleinkofer." 7 Schleinkofer's letter was addressed to a doctor
at the medical department of Gong's employer and said, in part, that
Gong "continued to work even with his poor health until, he had a
perforated peptic ulcer due to prednisone in May, 1986."488 The trial
judge ruled that the letter was not the kind of information reasonably
relied upon by experts.489 Thus, Rule 703 precluded the expert from
basing the opinion on this bit of information.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed on this issue, finding no abuse of
discretion in the judges decision to bar "the plaintiff's medical expert
from reading from Dr. Schleinkofer's letter or otherwise stating that
his opinion was based on the letter." 90 But the court then observed
that the judge could have reached the same result even if he had found
reasonable reliance.491 Rule 703, explained the court, "does not auto-
482. 913 F.2d 1269 (7th Cir. 1990).




487. Id. at 1272.
488. Gong, 913 F.2d at 1272 (emphasis added).
489. Id. The district court cited four reasons for its concern about the letter's trustworthiness.
First, Dr. Schleinkofer was not Gong's treating physician at the time he developed the ulcer.
Id. at 1272. Second, the source of Dr. Schleinkofer's opinion was itself unknown. Id. Third,
the purpose of the letter was to enable Gong to receive employment benefits. Id. Fourth, the
letter was not part of Gong's medical chart for purposes of rendering care and treatment. Id.
490. Id. at 1273 (footnote omitted).
491. Id.
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matically mean that the information itself is independently admissible
in evidence.' 9 2 Moreover:
In Nachtsheim, this court adopted the view that Rule 703 generally
permits experts to state the underlying basis of their opinions (if the
information is of the type reasonably relied upon by experts), but that
the underlying information still is subject to exclusion under the balancing
test of Rule 403.m
In short, the admissibility of the opinion does not automatically lead
to the disclosure of the underlying bases.
Although dicta, the Gong court's gloss on Nachtsheim reminded trial
judges that the amalgam of Rules 403, 703, and 705 imposes several
different hurdles where lawyers try to expose the jury to inadmissible
evidence through expert witnesses. First, it must pass the reasonable
reliance test of Rule 703.494 Reasonable reliance is, however, a low
threshold that rarely leaves trial judges in a sound position to overrule
an expert's own judgment about what she relies upon. Such rulings
also create needless headaches for appellate courts, particularly where
the expert's opinion is admitted regardless of the judge's Rule 703 finding,
as in Gong. Thus, the importance of the second consideration: what
the jury should be told about the bases for the expert's opinion. Usually,
then, the only concern at stake is exposing the jury to information that
is inadmissible through any other means. Skillful trial lawyers know
that Rule 703's low reasonable reliance standard provides a broad avenue
for exposing the jury to evidence that cannot be admitted for any number
of reasons. 495  Moreover, the admissibility of the expert's opinion
usually does not turn on a particular bases; rather, Rule 703 serves as
a convenient conduit for traversing what are otherwise insurmountable
evidentiary barriers. 496 The expert need only say that she reasonably
492. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Nachtshein v. Beech Aircraft Corp, 847 F.2d 1261, 1270
(7th Cir. 1988)).
493. Gong, 913 F.2d at 1273.
494. Id. at 1272.
495. Again, Gong is illustrative. Besides the Rule 703 route, plaintiff's counsel also attempted
unsuccessfully to admit the Schleinkofer letter through Rule 803(4) and to "impeach" Schleinkofer
himself. See Gong, 913 F.2d at 1274.
496. See, e.g., Rice, supra note 2, at 591 (stating that he shares Professor Carlson's concern
that "courts may permit experts to dump large quantities of unscreened evidence into the record").
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relies on this type of information. Limiting instructions are futile and
meaningless. The most effective way of preventing inevitable abuses
is to recognize that trial judges have the authority to bar disclosure to
the jury of some or all of the inadmissible bases even if the information
is of a type reasonably relied upon by experts. This is the lesson of
Nachtsheim and Gong.4
Several state courts have also recognized that proponents should not
be allowed to spill inadmissible evidence before the jury just because
the expert relied upon it.4  In Henson v. Triumph Trucking, Inc.,499
discussed earlier, the Arizona Court of Appeals refused to permit a
physician to support his opinion through evidence of prior drug abuse
that flagrantly violated the character rule.5s° When offered by the
proponent during direct examination, Rule 703 served only to launder
the inadmissible evidence. 01 Wisconsin courts have explicitly drawn
upon the Seventh Circuit's lead in Nachtsheim and Gong. In State v.
Weber,5 0 2 the Wisconsin Court of Appeals instructed that trial judges
have three options when confronted by proponents who want to disclose
inadmissible bases during the direct examination. s 3 Depending on
the nature of the evidence and the likelihood that a jury might misuse
the evidence, the judge can allow full disclosure (with a limiting instruc-
tion), partial disclosure identifying only the type or source of the
information, or preclude any mention of the inadmissible evidence. 504
497. The Seventh Circuit has applied Nachtsheim in several cases after Gong. See In re
James Wilson, 965 F.2d at 172-73. In In re James Wilson the Seventh Circuit again reminded
trial judges that Rule 703 should not be "used as a vehicle for circumventing the rules of
evidence." Moreover, "[t]he fact that inadmissible evidence is the (permissible) premise of
the expert's opinion does not make that evidence admissible for other purposes, purposes
independent of the opinion." Id. at 173; see also Finchum v. Ford Motor Co., 57 F.3d 526,
531-32 (7th Cir. 1995) (barring disclosure of an article on passenger restraints even though
the expert relied upon it in forming his opinion).
498. See, e.g., CHARLES W. EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE § 704.1, at 534-36 (1996 ed.)
(compilation of authorities). He argues that Florida should follow the Nachtsheim approach.
Id. at 536 n.18.
499. 180 Ariz. 305, 884 P.2d 191 (Ct. App. 1994).
500. Henson, 884 P.2d at 192.
501. Id. at 193; see supra text accompanying notes 407-10.
502. 174 Wis. 2d 98, 496 N.W.2d 762 (Ct. App. 1993).
503. Weber, 496 N.W.2d at 766 n.6.
504. Id.
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The Weber court noted, however, that cross-examiners have a considerably
broader license to inquire into the bases in order to challenge the expert's
opinions.50
Other states have eschewed case-law glosses in favor of rules that
deviate from the federal versions of Rule 703 and 705. -0 Some of
the rules are designed to assure that the expert's opinion has a sufficient
basis. Maine, for example, gives the opponent the right to voir dire
the expert in the jury's absence to determine what facts or data support
the expert's opinion.50' Upon a prima facie showing that the opinion
does not have a "sufficient basis," the expert's opinion is excluded unless
the proponent "first establishes the underlying facts or data."50 Other
state rules, however, directly address the reliance/disclosure distinction.
Minnesota provides that during direct examination the proponent can
only elicit expert data that is "independently admissible."'s The exclu-
sionary rule is subject to one tightly-woven exception: in civil cases,
where good cause is shown and "the underlying data is particularly
trustworthy," the evidence can be disclosed on direct examination "for
the limited purpose of showing the basis for the expert's opinion. ' ' 10
Cross-examination is not, however, restricted by this rule.511
Texas has codified an approach nearly identical to that set forth in
Nachtsheim v. Beech Aircraft Corp. 2 and Gong v. Hirsch.!S A
detailed rule applicable in criminal cases gives opponents a voir dire
right to determine if the expert's opinion is sufficiently supported.s14
A separate subsection addresses the disclosure problem using the same
approach taken by the Seventh Circuit:
505. Id.
506. See, e.g., DEL. R. EVID. 705; ME. R. EvID. 705; MINN. R. EvID. 705.
507. ME. R. EvlD. 705(b).
508. Id. A similar provisions is also found in Rule 705(b) of the Delaware Uniform Rules
of Evidence. DEL. R. EviD. 705. Florida has a rule that is substantially similar to the Maine
rule. FLA. STAT. ch. 90.705(b) (1995); see EHRHARDT, supra note 498, § 705.1.
509. MINN. R. EviD. 703(b).
510. Id.
511. Id.; see PETER N. THOMPSON, MINNESOTA PRACTIcE: EvIDENCE § 703.04 (2d ed.
1992).
512. 847 F.2d 1261 (7th Cir. 1988); see supra text accompanying notes 389-95.
513. 913 F.2d 1269 (7th Cir. 1990).
514. Thx. R. CRim. EvD. 705(b)-(c).
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(d) Balancing Test; Limiting Instructions. When the underlying facts
or data would be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose other than
to explain or support the expert's opinion or inference, the court shall
exclude the underlying facts or data if the danger that they will be used
for an improper purpose outweighs their value as explanation or support
for the expert's opinion. If the facts or data are disclosed before the
jury, a limiting instruction by the court shall be given upon request"5 L
Although the Texas civil rule is identical to the federal version of Rule
705, commentators on that state's evidence code conclude that trial judges
have the same discretion to exclude or restrict inadmissible bases in
civil cases as they do in criminal cases under the more detailed rule.516
IV. Conclusion
As we have seen, the common law rigidly policed expert testimony
in a sometimes fruitless attempt to assure that experts heeded exclusionary
rules, especially those regulating hearsay. The Federal Rules of Evidence
did not scrap the common-law procedures, whatever their defects. Rules
702 through 705, together with several innovative hearsay exceptions
relating to learned treatises and patients' statements to physicians,
represent a reform---not a repudiation-of the common-law approach.5 17
Moreover, the Advisory Committee's disparaging comments about limiting
instructions make it inconceivable that direct examiners have the right
to spill inadmissible evidence before the jury ostensibly to better explain
"where the expert is coming from."518 Henson v. Triumph Trucking,
Inc.5s 9 dramatically illustrates that lawyers can and will use Rule 703
to launder any form of inadmissible evidence subject only to incomprehen-
sible limiting instructions.5s If one concedes that limiting instructions
are futile, this leaves only two options: allow the jury to use the evidence
515. TEx. R. CRim. Evi. 705(d).
516. TEx. R. CiviL. EVID. 705; see 2 STEvEN GOODE ET AL., TEXAS PRACTIcE: GuIDE TO
THE TEXAS RULES OF EVIDENCE: CIvIL AND CRIuNAL § 705.3, at 75-76 (2d ed. 1993).
517. See discussion supra parts III.A-C.
518. See FED. R. EvD. 803(4) advisory committee's note.
519. 180 Ariz. 305, 884 P.2d 191 (Ct. App. 1994).
520. See supra text accompanying notes 399-411.
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for the same purpose as the expert did (full use) or restrict disclosure
to the jury.
The problem with the full-use approach is that there is no sensible
stopping point. Rule 703 imposes a low threshold that seldom leaves
the trial judge in a position to countermandthe expert's insistence that
he reasonably relies on some type of inadmissible information. Staring
at a cold record armed with only an abuse of discretion standard of
review, appellate courts can be reluctant to second-guess trial judges
with holdings that are extremely fact intensive and, thus, of limited
precedential value. Moreover, Rule 702 welcomes a broad range of
experts yet demands only modest qualifications. Full disclosure thus
creates an unacceptable risk of experts deciding for themselves what
kind of evidence the jury should hear using dubious criteria that conflict
with the exclusionary rules that govern the proof process. In short, full
disclosure subordinates judges and the rules of evidence to experts with
their own, often ill-defined, standards.
Nachtsheim and Gong reveal, however, that some courts are unwilling
to abdicate their role of determining what information the jury will receive
about the facts of the case.5 ' According to these cases, Rule 703
contemplates a clear distinction between what experts can rely upon
in reaching conclusions and how much of this information can be
disclosed to the jury."2
The only sensible approach is one that distinguishes the expert's
reliance-Rule 703-from the judge's authority to control disclosure-
Rule 705. Plainly, Rule 703 reformed the common law. As the Advisory
Committee proudly proclaimed, the rule imposes parity between the
courtroom and the expert's laboratory or office; that is, whatever the
expert normally relies upon in practice can be used as a basis for opinion
testimony." Less obviously, Rule 703 not only "[brought the] judicial
practice into line with the practice of the experts themselves when not
in court," 24 but also realigned judicial practice with the reality of
521. Gong v. Hirsch, 913 F.2d 1269 (7th Cir. 1990); Nachtsheim v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,
847 F.2d 1261 (7th Cir. 1988).
522. See Gong, 913 F.2d 1269; Nachtsheim, 847 F.2d 1261.
523. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee's note.
524. Id.
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how lawyers prepared experts to testify. Rule 703 blew away the fiction
that experts learned about the case-specific bases by listening to garbled
hypothetical assumptions or observing other witnesses testify. In reality,
lawyers prime experts before they take the stand. In arriving at their
opinions, experts read reports, interview witnesses, talk to lawyers, and
rely on innumerable forms of evidence that are inadmissible for any
number of reasons.52s But just because experts reasonably rely on
such information does not a fortiori render it admissible or otherwise
ripe for disclosure by the direct examiner.
Read together, then, Rules 703 and 705 require three discrete but
related inquiries. First, why is the evidentiary basis inadmissible?s2
For example, is the problem tied to hearsay, character evidence, authenti-
cation, etc. Under our adversarial system, opposing counsel is generally
responsible for identifying the precise objection unless the judge inter-
venes sua sponte.s " Second, in light of the evidentiary disability,
525. See Robert F. Hanley, Preparing the Expert Witness in Rossi, supra note 233, at 155-70.
In a separate essay, Professor Rossi explained the danger of misuse in blunt terms:
Is there not a lesson here for the trial lawyer? Assume she has a relevant document
that she would like to get into evidence. But she cannot. It is hearsay not within
any of the exceptions to the rule against hearsay. If offered directly, it will be rejected.
What is to be done? Hire an expert. If the expert can give a favorable opinion based
in part on the document and, if the expert's reliance on the material is reasonable,
the opinion will be allowed. The expert can also explain the basis for that opinion
and, in doing so, may be allowed to describe the contents of the document. Would
such a scenario violate the hearsay rule? The best evidence rule? Does it make any
difference if our expert's opinion was based solely and entirely upon the inadmissible
document?
Rossi, supra note 233, ch. 3, at 81. Later in the same essay, Rossi summarized the potency
of Rule 703:
The lesson for the trial lawyer is that Rule 703 is a potent weapon on several levels.
It allows an opinion to be based on otherwise inadmissible, but "reliable," data. It
then, as most cases say, permits the jury to hear information normally considered
improper evidence. By allowing one expert to recite the sources upon which he relied,
it permits the one expert to substitute for other witnesses or documents that no longer
need be presented.
Id. at 97.
526. Of course, if the basis is admissible the expert can rely on it without raising any
perplexing issues about disclosure.
527. The proponent can, of course, offer the basis for a limited, admissible purpose in the
first instance.
1997]
HeinOnline  -- 20 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 557 1996-1997
AMERICAN JOUIN AL OF TRIAL ADVOCACY
do experts in the field reasonably rely on this type of information?
Many experts rely on what lawyers identify as hearsay, but propensity
inferences might be as suspect in the expert's field as they are in law.
Thus, the type of evidence must include consideration of the inferences
the expert draws. 528 Third, should the inadmissible bases be disclosed
to the jury even if the expert reasonably relied on it in rendering an
opinion? Experts are in the best position to tell the judge what they
do or do not reasonably rely upon, but the judge is in a better position
to determine what the jury should hear, consistent with the exclusionary
rules of evidence. Again character evidence provides a good example.
Even if a doctor customarily uses a propensity inference when making
a diagnosis, the law of evidence has its own very good reasons for
keeping the party's background from the jury. A doctor might need
this sort of information to prescribe a treatment plan, but at trial there
is a danger that a jury might use it to punish the offender, a risk that
is (one hopes) entirely absent in the doctor's use of the information. 29
Rule 705 distinguishes between disclosure during direct and cross-
examination."-' On direct examination the expert is permitted to testify
to an opinion and the "reasons therefor. ' ,531 The expert may also de-
scribe facts or data that have been, or will be, admitted into evidence.532
The direct examiner cannot, however, elicit inadmissible case-specific
data in the ordinary course. Normally, there should be no mention of
such information. Where some reference is necessary in order to
adequately explain the expert's reasoning, the judge can allow an oblique
reference to the type of information, but not any details. For example,
an expert could indicate that she relied on "various reports" but could
528. In Henson v. Triumph Trucking, Inc., 180 Ariz. 305, 884 P.2d 191 (Ct. App. 1994),
the driver's past drug abuse was lumped into the category of "clinical history." Henson, 884
P.2d at 193. One wonders, however, whether a treating physician would have been as willing
as the defendant's hired expert witness to jump to the conclusion that the driver misused Xanax
based on his history of abuse. In short, the question is whether a doctor would base a diagnosis
and predicate treatment-as opposed to courtroom testimony-on the drug history.
529. See 1 MCCORMcC II, supra note 60, § 188, at 793 (character when used as circumstantial
evidence of conduct, "while typically being of relatively slight value, usually is laden with
the dangerous baggage of prejudice, distraction, time consumption and surprise').
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not quote or otherwise detail them during the direct examination. Thus,
the judge can bar the expert from making any reference to inadmissible
data or allow only a generic reference barren of any details that might
be misused by the jury. Where the inadmissible data relates to something
other than case-specific information, such as the expert's major premise,
the judge might allow a more detailed recitation of the bases.s "
In contrast to the direct examiner, the cross-examiner has greater
latitude to explore the expert's bases in order to test the soundness of
the witness's opinions and reasoning s34 Tactically, one can expect
that cross-examiners will elicit only those inadmissible bases that favor
their party's cause. Moreover, disclosure during cross-examination does
not carry the same risk that the expert, who was most likely retained
by the direct examiner, is "laundering" inadmissible evidence. Although
cross-examiners should have greater leeway, this falls short of carte
blanche. Thus, cross-examiners can attack experts on the ground that
they failed to consider certain information. However, where the expert's
omission involves inadmissible evidence that the expert should have
reasonably relied upon, the judge can restrict questions to the type of
information as opposed to its details.s3s
Finally, it is suggested that where a hearsay basis fails to qualify
under one of the more commonly used exceptions, an expert's assistance
might be used to help establish "equivalent circumstantial guarantees
of trustworthiness" under the residual exceptions.s ' The applicability
533. See Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 369 (concerning "research data").
534. See 1 MCCORMICK II, supra note 60, § 13, at 56-57.
535. Id.
536. Rule 803(24) states:
A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that
(A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more
probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent
can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules
and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into
evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the
proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial
or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it,
the proponent's intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including
the name and address of the declarant.
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of any hearsay exception is a preliminary question for the judge under
Rule 104(a). 37 In making such determinations, the judge is not bound
by the rules of evidence and may even use the questioned hearsay itself
in establishing the foundation.s5  Thus, nothing precludes experts
from advising judges about whether out-of-court statements possess
the requisite trustworthiness.L3 Of course the judge has the final say
under Rule 104(a), but the expert might be able to supply helpful guidance
to the judge. Nor is there anything iconoclastic about this suggestion.
Experts already advise judges about whether a statement was made for
purposes of diagnosis or opinion under Rule 803(4) or is sufficiently
authoritative under the learned treatise exception, Rule 803(18).
We should also consider using our experience to create other hearsay
exceptions akin to Rule 803(4) (statements to physicians) or 803(18)
(learned treatises).5 True, the list of exceptions is presently cumber-
some, but nothing precludes adding to the list. Some inflation has already
occurred in cases that expansively construe "medical diagnosis or opinion"
under Rule 803(4) as a general "health care provider" exception. 41
FED. R. EVmD. 803(24). Rule 804(b)(5) is virtually identical, but requires a preliminary showing
of the declarant's unavailability. See Rice, supra note 2, at 591 (advocating a "new exception"
for expert hearsay but also arguing that "[u]ntil the Federal Rules of Evidence incorporate a
new hearsay exception to accommodate specifically the new dimensions of the proposed practice
under Rule 703, courts could admit this hearsay under the residual exceptions codified in Rules
803(24) and 804(b)(5)" (footnote omitted)).
537. FED. R. EviD. 104(a).
538. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 178, 107 S. Ct. 2775, 2780, 97 L. Ed. 2d
144, 154 (1987).
539. It is suggested only that the expert might provide assistance on the trustworthiness
issue. Other matters under the residuals, such as the statement's materiality, its probative value,
and the interests of justice are peculiarly in the judge's province and fall outside the bounds
of expert assistance.
540. See Rice, supra note 2, at 591. Professor Rice advocated using the residual exceptions
as stop gap measures "[u]ntil the Federal Rules of Evidence incorporate a new hearsay exception
to accommodate specifically the new dimensions of the proposed practice under Rule 703."
Id. The "proposed practice" holds that "[i]f the judge properly screens expert opinions to ensure
compliance with Rule 703's expanded basis requirements, no justification exists for precluding
the finder of fact from hearing and using those facts supporting the opinion to the same extent
as the expert." Id. at 590. My argument is that instead of another generic provision like Rule
703, we need specific exceptions like Rule 803(4).
541. FED. R. EvID. 803(4). See, e.g., 2 GRAHAM, supra note 334, § 803.4, at 418 (citing
and discussing case law that extends the exception to "psychologists"). Wisconsin, for example,
has construed "medical" in its counterpart to Rule 803(4) as reaching chiropractors and
psychologists. See BLINKA, supra note 230, at 472.
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These suggestions-barring disclosure of inadmissible bases during
direct examination, making more creative use of the residual exceptions,
and creating new expert-based exceptions where appropriate-take into
account not just the text and history of federal rules, but also the way
that lawyers use evidence in the courtroom. Moreover, it must be
conceded that neither Rule 703 nor any single rule can hope to reconcile
the practice of experts in all fields with the very different imperatives
that apply in the courtroom. But what must be avoided is the cynical
degradation of exclusionary rules through the unhappy, ill-advised
marriage of experts and limited admissibility. In our trial system the
judge determines what evidence the jury will see or hear. Nothing in
the text or history of Rule 703 supports the view that the expert's
suzerainty extends to all aspects of his testimony. The expert may tell
the jury about his opinions, reasoning, and bases, but only at the express
permission of the judge-the ultimate arbiter.
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